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Chinese Organized Crime in Western and Eastern Europe

I. GENERAL REMARKS

Regarding transnational criminal organizations, national authorities of Germany, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and the United States of America find that groups which deserve international attention are, in alphabetical order: Chinese triads, Colombian cartels, Jamaican posses, Japanese yakusa, Sicilian mafia, Russian criminal organizations and West African groups such as Nigerian organized crime groups.¹

Chinese triads are involved in a whole range of criminal activities, including extortion, drug trafficking, prostitution, gambling, and sideline businesses in Chinese videos, books, newspapers and entertainment services. They also have extensive overseas networks that allow them to engage in transnational criminal activity with great ease. Triads are well established in every major Chinese community across the world. International activities include heavy participation in heroin trafficking toward the United States and Europe combined with arms smuggling and other kinds of opportunistic activities, such as theft and smuggling of luxury automobiles and yachts to wealthier markets and consumer goods to the People's Republic of China, and international credit card frauds. The smuggling of illegal aliens not only to the United States but also to Europe is particularly intensive.²

In my paper I would like to present some issues of Chinese organized crime in selected European countries, the scope of activities, and new problems and challenges concerning combating this phenomenon.

II. TRANSFER OF CHINESE NATIONALS TO EUROPE BY A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION OPERATING ON AN INTERNATIONAL SCALE (from the perspective of Austrian experiences)³

According to information obtained from the Austrian Police, the criminal organization consists of multiple criminal groups which constitute its cells. Its leadership is located in Beijing. The organization is hierarchic in structure and has a number of levels. Isolating the separate cells of the organization, both from the outside and the inside, guarantees that a given cell knows only the functions of the cell which is located directly above it, that is the one from which it receives the tasks it is to accomplish. Such a cell does not know anything at all, or anything specific, about the members and the tasks of the cell which is located above the one from which it receives its tasks.⁴

The main tasks of the organization's leadership in Beijing

1. Conduct a recruiting campaign in appropriate media (the press), with the purpose of finding persons who want to leave the country,

2. Determine the fee for the illegal smuggling, depending on the country of destination (target country),

3. Identify an appropriate route to the target country,

4. Provide appropriate guidance to the smuggled persons concerning behavior at specific stages of the transfer,

5. Obtain Korean passports in South Korea and send them, via DHL, to Austria,

6. Completely falsify or remake the passports and other key documents (for instance, certificates for technical professions, health certificates, etc.),

7. Coordinate actions and manage cooperating cells.

Prestige criteria of a criminal organization

The prestige of a given criminal organization depends on its effectiveness in transferring persons through borders. The more effectively the organization operates, the more persons willing to leave the country will trust it. Particularly effective are those organizations which provide such persons "a guarantee of effectiveness"; that is to say, the criminal organization guarantees its "customers" that they will be transferred to the target country even if they are stopped, perhaps many times, by the police or the customs service. Such a guarantee requires a respectively higher fee.

Cooperation between separate cells of the criminal organization

An organization that smuggles people through international borders can effectively function only when each and every one of its cells accomplishes its tasks. A specific cell is therefore dependent on its neighboring cells. If the police or the customs service apprehends the persons being smuggled by one cell, then the neighboring cell, which would otherwise take those persons over in the next stage of the transfer, will be deprived of its work and, in consequence, of the expected profits. Therefore, a lack of success in a specific cell's operations brings not only an increase in additional costs, but also a drop in the prestige of the organization. Consequently, due to a "by the word of mouth propaganda," a decrease in the number of customers is the outcome for the organization's leadership in Beijing.

Costs, additional costs and profits of criminal groups

Every cell of the criminal organization bears the current costs of housing and feeding the smuggled persons until they are handed to the next cell. At the same time, every cell acts in accordance with the principle of maximizing profits.⁵ Any mistakes made by a given cell may result in financial losses, which the cell has to cover from its own resources.

In the example presented above, the Austria/Vienna cell received forty Chinese nationals from a cell operating in Hungary, with the aim of further transferring them to the target country, in this particular case France, and more specifically Paris. The cell was obligated to cover the cost of housing and feeding these persons until their further transfer. Further costs incurred by the group were related to the purchase, using Korean passports in a travel agency, of plane tickets, which were necessary to transfer them from Austria to Paris. Before the flight to Paris, the "customers" received new clothing and backpacks in order to resemble regular tourists. At the moment of their leaving the flat where they were in temporary hiding, they were clothed differently.

If the smuggled persons are apprehended before they reach the target country by the police or other services, the Austria/Vienna criminal group not only will not receive the agreed payment, but also will have to cover all previously incurred costs. Moreover, if the group has granted the "guarantee of effectiveness," it will be obligated to take further actions necessary to assure the "customers'" arrival in the target country. Consequently, they will be obligated to cover any associated expenses, to include the purchase of plane tickets.

The process of transferring persons

For the smuggled persons, the criminal group leases specially selected flats, using the Korean passports. The flats are in houses which are located next to streets with high traffic levels, and have at least two entrances and exits. These elements are dictated by the need, on the one hand, to make possible an escape and, on the other hand, to hinder or make impossible an observation of the house by the police.

During their stay, the "customers" are guarded by the criminal group members and provided food and clothing. Before the next transfer, they receive detailed instructions pertaining to their behavior during the transfer, especially during a possible apprehension by the police or customs services. From the very beginning of the transfer and until the arrival in the target country, they are accompanied by a designated guardian (accompanying person). The persons participating in the transfer receive the plane tickets and the Korean passports just before the beginning of their trip.

In the target country, the transferred personnel are received by members of the local criminal organization. The guardian who has accompanied them until then receives the "customers'" Korean passports, as well as a fee for the successful transfer from the local organization. The guardian then returns, by plane or train, to Austria, where he hands his boss the fee and the passports he has collected. The passports are used during future transfers, until they are taken away during a transfer from the "customers" by the appropriate services, or from the group guardian during his return to Austria.

Transfer fees and methods of payment

The fees depend on the category of the target country, the estimated risk to the organization, and the type of tariff (regular or one with "guarantee of effectiveness").⁶ Definitely more expensive, due to high risk, are transfers from Beijing to England.

Many methods of payment have been observed. In the case of transfers with the "guarantee of effectiveness," the whole amount of the fee is paid in Beijing. In other cases, only an advance installment is paid in Beijing, and its amount depends on the target country. Only after the "customers" arrive in the target country is the remaining amount paid by their families, most often through the Western Union Bank or directly to the initiator of the transfer in Beijing. It is necessary to highlight the fact that the "customers" are set free in the target country or allowed to join their relatives in that country only after the remaining amount is paid.

There is another option available in which the customers pay only an advance installment depending on the target country and agree to pay off the remaining amount by working in the target country. The place of their employment can be a Chinese restaurant, a factory or a brothel. The work may also consist of temporary or permanent participation in the activities of a criminal group which deals in smuggling people.

The use of Korean passports and transfer routes

Korean passports are used to transfer "customers" from Austria to the target country. The reason for using such passports is the fact that Koreans traveling in the European Union are not required to obtain visas. The initiators of a transfer in Beijing purchase such passports in South Korea, paying special attention to their quality. Good quality means a distant expiry date, which allows for their use over extended periods, as well as the possibility of using special travel fares for youths. In case of transfers by plane, such fares maximize the group's profits.

After the purchase in South Korea, the passports are sent from Beijing to a criminal group in Austria via DHL. The initiators from Beijing mark every package with an appropriate code word and the recipient's phone number. The phones used by the criminal group are prepaid mobile phones, which makes it impossible to identify their owners. When the package arrives in a DHL post in Austria, an employee calls the specified number and passes information to the recipient about the arrival of the package, which the recipient can collect after providing a certain code word.

Criminal groups (cells) responsible for transfers to Austria

There are three groups: "Hungarian" (responsible almost exclusively for "customers" from the Fujian Province); "Czech" and "Slovak". It is necessary to highlight the fact that most transfers from Slovakia to Austria go through the Czech Republic. The leaders of all the respective groups are Chinese nationals.

European target countries and participants in the illegal process

The Austrian law enforcement agencies have observed that for the criminal organizations Austria is only a transit country. The target countries are: Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Holland, Great Britain, Portugal, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Most common means of transportation are airlines. If the destination is northern Italy, the transfer is done by train.

Another observation was that the Chinese nationals participating in the illegal transfer had been involved in different criminal groups constituting the organization before they were apprehended by the Austrian police. Many suspects had been involved in the activities of similar groups in Moscow, Chechnya, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, France, and Spain.

III. CHINESE ORGANIZED CRIME IN COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER "EASTERN BLOC"

Discussing the main problems of Chinese organized crime in Europe, we should, among others, point out that we are observing the development of a different criminal subculture among the Chinese communities not only in Western Europe, but also in Central European countries of the former "Eastern Bloc." These countries have undergone major political changes which have also involved the reorganization of economic systems into free markets.⁷ Criminal organizations (both local and foreign) have benefited from the situation, using the opportunities offered by economic systems to expand their traffic and to invest their illicit proceeds in the financial system by corrupting political figures and public officials.

Chinese criminal structures in the Czech Republic

One can see a constant growth of business activities, mainly in the area of establishment of new companies and opening new restaurants. A lot of investment capital has been invested in the Czech Republic, the origin of which is in many cases at least unclear. There is a presumption that due to benevolent laws, a huge amount of illegal financial means is laundered in the Czech Republic. Because of certain issues caused especially by a language barrier and the completely different mentality between the ethnic groups, the information examined at respective cases was not "finalized" into implementation at a specific person. It is clear that in the Czech Republic, Chinese businessmen utilise rich experience from abroad -- in the establishment of companies, in accountancy, in dealing with relevant legislation at a high level. Taking legal action against the illegal activities of such efficient companies is very difficult.

Roughly it can be said that there are three groups of Chinese coming to the Czech Republic: 1) Tradesmen from poor areas of China; 2) People who get university degrees in the Czech Republic and who, in overwhelming majority, go back to China; and 3) People who use the Czech Republic as a hiding place from criminal prosecution for their criminal activities outside the Czech Republic.

As for relations between Vietnamese and Chinese, one can say that there were no significant contacts registered. If there are any, the Vietnamese play the role of lower ranked "help force" for "rough jobs," but not the one of equal partners.⁸8

Chinese criminal structures in Hungary

Contrary to forecasts, the number of criminal acts committed by Chinese nationals has so far been relatively low. Since the mid-nineties, a large Chinese community of almost 30,000 people has existed in Hungary. Its immigrating efforts have grown stronger year by year. Initially, the Chinese people regarded Hungary as a station on the way to Western Europe.⁹

Now Hungary has become a target country for their migration. Consequently, the number of crimes committed by these immigrants has increased. The number of crimes against public order committed with their participation has doubled since 1995; nevertheless, the most numerous crime is falsification of documents, such as various manipulations with passports and residence permits, which are usually connected with further violations of the statute on foreigners.

Those Chinese nationals who conduct trade in Hungary have, for the most part, legally issued permits allowing them to stay and conduct trade, which corresponds with their way of life which stresses the need to abide by existing norms.¹⁰ Only the yearly occurrence of mutilations and murders indicates that every so often violent conflicts take place between competing groups. The trade activity of the Chinese in Hungary focuses on open marketplaces -- called Chinese markets -- where the main category of goods are mass produced industrial goods, such as clothing and household supplies. This type of economic activity can easily be controlled by both the police and security agencies which are present at the marketplaces.

The largest section (90-95%) of the foreigners who perpetrate criminal acts in Hungary has always been, and still is, of European origin. Asians constitute 6-7%, Africans about 2%, and Americans between 1 and 2%. Statistical data demonstrate that the most common perpetrators were Romanians, Yugoslavs, Ukrainians, Poles, Slovaks, Croats and Germans.¹¹ For the most part, they committed single crimes; however, some, especially those belonging to the category of professional criminals, committed multiple criminal acts. As far as the sex of the perpetrators is concerned, among the Romanian, Ukrainian, Polish and Russian criminals, a large fraction are women. At the same time, participation of women in criminal activity is not at all typical among the Yugoslavs, Germans, Austrians, and Chinese.¹²

With respect to the statistical data,¹³ it is necessary to highlight the fact that criminal activity by the Chinese nationals is so low due to the fact that both the victims and the perpetrators are of Chinese origin. Crimes committed within an ethnic group are hardly ever reported to the police. The rationale for such behavior among victims is, first of all, a fear of repressive actions on the part of their community, and second, the fact that the Chinese community handles the punishment of perpetrators or tries to resolve conflicts through informal reconciliation. As we see, the social organization of the Chinese community, traditionally focused on family and society, hinders the explication of existing social, sociological, and criminal relations in their groups. According to Hungarian experts, one cannot completely exclude the possibility that the presence of a systematically expanding Chinese community may in the future pose a threat even to the national security of the country.

Chinese nationals in Poland

1. The Case of Mr. Mandugeqi and Ms. Jinge

On 24 July 1994 the Chinese Security Services issued warrants of arrest against Mr. Mandugeqi and Ms. Jinge on charges of fraud under Article 152 of the Chinese Act on Penalties committed by misappropriation of property in sum of approximately 10 million juan, i.e. 2.1 million US dollars.

On 10 August 1996 the applicants were apprehended by the police at the border and arrested at the Warsaw Okecie International Airport by virtue of an international warrant of arrest issued by Interpol in November 1994 upon request of the Chinese branch of Interpol.

On 11 August 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court remanded them in custody with a view to extradition on suspicion of fraud.

On 2 September 1996 the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a request for extradition to the Polish Government.

On 14 October 1996 Mr. Mandugeqi and Ms. Jinge were heard by the Warsaw Regional Court within the framework of the extradition proceedings.

On 7 February 1997 the Warsaw Regional Court pronounced an opinion as to the admissibility of the extradition of Mr. Mandugeqi and Ms. Jinge:

The Regional Court considered that it transpired from the documents submitted with the request for extradition that the charges against the applicants were punishable under the provisions of the Polish Criminal Code. Thus, the necessary requirement for extradition, that the acts concerned were punishable in both countries, was complied with.

The Regional Court went on to state that the condition of reciprocity between Poland and China was not met as there was no treaty on extradition between Poland and China and that there had not been any case of extradition between these countries in recent years. Thus it could not be established that China would ensure reciprocity.

The Court further considered that the applicants' extradition would be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. It transpired from the explanations given by the applicants before the Court and from the materials submitted by Amnesty International, in particular from its Report for 1995, that there were serious grounds for believing that, if extradited, the persons extradited, regardless of the character of their offence, would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention both during the investigations and during the execution of a prison penalty.

The Court concluded that in its opinion the applicants' extradition would not be compatible with the Polish legal order insofar as it incorporated the international conventions ratified by Poland and in particular the European Convention on Human Rights.

On 11 February 1997 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor lodged an appeal against the opinion.

On 7 March 1997 the Warsaw Court of Appeal quashed the opinion of 7 February 1997 and pronounced an opinion to the effect that the applicants' extradition would be admissible.

The Court further had regard to the information submitted in the extradition request, i.e. that criminal proceedings had been instituted against the applicants in which the public prosecutor had conducted a "thorough investigation as to the frauds committed" by them, and to the summary of facts, supported by evidence, as to the offences with which the applicants had been charged which had been annexed to the extradition request.

The Court of Appeal further observed that it had not disregarded the arguments submitted by the applicants, based on the reports of Amnesty International.

The Court of Appeal finally concluded that, in light of these considerations, neither the applicants' actual social position nor the character of the charges against them, which were far from being of a political character, would justify the conclusion that they ran a risk of being subjected to such an extreme form of discrimination as to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The Court concluded that there were no legal obstacles to the applicants' extradition.

On 18 March 1997 the Warsaw Court of Appeal prolonged the applicants' detention pending extradition until 20 July 1997.

On 13 April 1997 the applicants lodged an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court.

On 29 July 1997 the Supreme Court rendered a decision in the cassation proceedings. The Court considered that under Article 1 of the Convention the States Parties were obliged to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. This article has applied to the Chinese citizens who are staying in Poland.

Article 3 of the Convention prohibits torture and inhumane and degrading treatment. Thus, a decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive might give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention. It was not necessary to have established with certainty that the extradited person would be subject to treatment contrary to this provision.

The Supreme Court further considered that the applicants' extradition would be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, based on the explanations given by the applicants before the Court and from the materials submitted by Amnesty International (AI). According to the AI report, Mr. Mandugeqi and Ms. Jinge could be treated in China in a way colliding with the Convention.¹⁴

Poland as country of interest to Chinese criminal groups

No signs of activity by Chinese criminal groups have been positively recognized so far. A system of monitoring ethnic criminal groups is currently being introduced. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that Poland is a country of interest to Chinese groups which for several years have been operating in Hungary.

In the 1990's a number of firms, controlled by Chinese nationals and serving as a cover for criminal activities, have been established in Hungary. Legal forms of business are most often bars and restaurants, as well as restricted massage clubs and paramedical centers. The most common criminal activity is drug traffic (heroin). Some signs have been observed which indicate that in 2001 the first representatives of the groups, after multiple visits lasting up to twenty days, were planning to settle in Poland, in the Mazowsze region, in towns located in the direct vicinity of Warsaw.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Foreigners-related crime is a phenomenon which on a worldwide scale shows not only a dynamic upward tendency but also is undergoing vital quality changes. In Europe this is proved by many years' experience of West European countries, confronted with more and more dangerous aspects of foreigners-related crime, especially of an organized nature. Members of the Chinese criminal subculture include import-export businessmen, community leaders, restaurant owners, workers, gamblers, housewives, and the unemployed. It is difficult to penetrate this subculture because members have no prior criminal records, no identifiable organization, and no rigid structure, nor clearly defined deviant norms and values. They can conceal their criminal activities through their involvement in lawful business activities.¹⁵

The biggest problem we face today is the increase of transnational crime. Representatives of law enforcement agencies involved in combating criminal activities related to the organized transfer of persons through international borders believe that only countering the "roots" of this criminal activity can bring positive results. This means that it is necessary to take appropriate preventive and repressive measures in the "source" country and to obtain the support of this country with respect to cooperation with law enforcement and judicial institutions in transit and target countries.¹⁶

Globalization, an increasingly border-free world and technological advances offer many opportunities for all human beings, but also for criminals. By using the opportunities of new technology, such as modern banking, criminals make use of the advantages of internationalizing. This development requires worldwide cooperation and new solutions.

NOTES

1. See Sabrina Adamoli, Andrea Di Nicola, Ernesto U. Savona, Paola Zofi, Organised Crime Around the World, HEUNI, Helsinki 1998, pp. 49-57.

2. See Reinhard Tomm, Aktuelle Lagebild der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Bereich der Schleusungskriminalitaet, in: Mitteeuropaeische Polizeiakademie, Schleusungskriminalitaet, Zentraleskoordinationsbuero der MEPA, Wien 2001, p. 7 and following.

3. The information presented here has been obtained from the Austrian Police, which conducted surveillance of the activities as a part of a special operation bearing the cryptonym "Operation Zenit."

4. For example, the Chinese nationals who were smuggled through borders on foot or by vehicles know only those who perform tasks in a given cell. They do not know who is the boss of the cell or with whom in other cells the cell cooperates. Consequently, those Chinese nationals who are apprehended in situations of this type are really in no capacity to provide any information about the leadership of the criminal organization.

5. For example, the Austrian police have found forty persons awaiting the next stage of the transfer being kept in inhumane conditions in a small room, in a 50-square-meter flat.

6. For example, the fees for some routes are indicated as follows: Beijing to France, between $10,000 and $12,000; Beijing to Madrid, $12,000; Beijing to Italy, $10,000.

7. For more see Challenges of Policing Democracies: A World Perspective (edited by Dilip K. Das and Otwin Marenin), Gordon and Breach Publishers, Amsterdam 2000.

8. See Police of the Czech Republic, National Anti-Drug Central and Criminal Police and Investigation Services, Annual Report 2001, Prague, 25th January 2002, pp. 15-16.

9. Data received from Central European Police Academy.

10. Data received from Central European Police Academy.

11. For more on this issue see Szilveszter Poczik, Auslaendische Straftaeter in Ungarn im Spiegel der Kriminalstatistik - Ueberblick von den 10 letzten Jahren, in: Mitteeuropaeische Polizeiakademie, Internationale kriminelle Gruppen, Zentraleskoordinationsbuero der MEPA, Wien 2001, p. 60 and following.

12. Ibidem, p. 63.

13. Ibidem, p. 75.

14. Under article 534 section 1 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure the request for extradition shall be refused if the person concerned is a Polish citizen or has been granted asylum in Poland. Under article 534 section 2 the extradition may be refused:
      1) if the criminal offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Poland;
     2) if criminal proceedings concerning the same act committed by the same person are pending, were pending or ended by a final decision in Poland;
     3) if under the law of the requesting State the offence concerned is subject to a penalty not exceeding one year or to a lesser penalty, or the penalty imposed does not exceed this period;
     4) if pursuant to Polish law the offence is subject to private prosecution and;
     5) if the requesting State does not guarantee reciprocity.

15. See Sheldon Zhang and Ko-lin Chin, Snakeheads: Chinese Human Trafficking Organizations, paper delivered at the International Conference on "Strategies of the EU and the US in Combating Transnational Organized Crime", Ghent/Belgium, 23-26 January 2001.

16. See He Bingsong, "Organized Crime: A Perspective from China," in Organized Crime: World Perspectives (edited by Jay S. Albanese, Dilip K. Das, Arwind Verma), Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 2003, p. 288 and following.

Professor Plywaczewski is the director of the Department of Criminology and Organized Crime Issues of the School of Law at the University of Bialystok, Poland.

Since 2001, he has been serving as a United Nations consultant for the implementation of its project "Assessment of Organized Crime in Central Asia." In 1997, Dr. Plywaczewski was awarded The Distinguished International Scholar Award of the American Society of Criminology.

He has produced more than 200 publications, printed in Poland and abroad. He has initiated and organized several international conferences in Poland and participated in dozens of congresses, conferences, seminars and colloquia on crime prevention organized by the UNO, Council of Europe, International Association of Penal Law, International Society of Criminology, American Society of Criminology and other international organizations. An acknowledged expert on organized crime, he has been a guest lecturer at universities in Germany, Greece, India, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, United States, and Switzerland.

"Chinese Organized Crime in Western and Eastern Europe" is based -- with some changes and supplements -- on the paper Professor Plywaczewski delivered at the 3rd Annual Symposium "Crime and Its Control in Greater China," June 21-22, 2002, the University of Hong Kong, PRC.

This paper was reprinted with permission of the author.