The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (continued)
Independent Journal Wednesday, January 23, 1788
[James Madison]
To the People of the State of New York:
THE fourth
class comprises the following miscellaneous powers:
1. A power "to promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right
of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong
to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims
of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provisions for
either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this
point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.
2. "To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases
whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by
cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of
the government of the United States; and to exercise like authority over all
places purchased by the consent of the legislatures of the States in which the
same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and
other needful buildings."
The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the
seat of government, carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by
every legislature of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its
general supremacy. Without it, not only the public authority might be insulted
and its proceedings interrupted with impunity; but a dependence of the members
of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of the government,
for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national
councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable to the
government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy. This
consideration has the more weight, as the gradual accumulation of public
improvements at the stationary residence of the government would be both too
great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and would
create so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as still further to
abridge its necessary independence. The extent of this federal district is
sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature. And
as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it;
as the State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent
of the citizens inhabiting it; as the inhabitants will find sufficient
inducements of interest to become willing parties to the cession; as they will
have had their voice in the election of the government which is to exercise
authority over them; as a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from
their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as the authority of the
legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it, to
concur in the cession, will be derived from the whole people of the State in
their adoption of the Constitution, every imaginable objection seems to be
obviated.
The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines,
etc., established by the general government, is not less evident. The public
money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them,
requires that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State.
Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union
may depend, to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All
objections and scruples are here also obviated, by requiring the concurrence of
the States concerned, in every such establishment.
3. "To declare the punishment of treason, but no
attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except
during the life of the person attained."
As treason may be committed against the United States, the
authority of the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as
new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent
factions, the natural offspring of free government, have usually wreaked their
alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with great judgment,
opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional
definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for conviction of it, and
restraining the Congress, even in punishing it, from extending the consequences
of guilt beyond the person of its author.
4. "To admit new States into the Union; but no new
State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor
any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States,
without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of
the Congress."
In the articles of Confederation, no provision is found
on this important subject. Canada was to be admitted of right, on her joining in
the measures of the United States; and the other colonies, by which were
evidently meant the other British colonies, at the discretion of nine States.
The eventual establishment of new States seems to have been overlooked
by the compilers of that instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of this
omission, and the assumption of power into which Congress have been led by it.
With great propriety, therefore, has the new system supplied the defect. The
general precaution, that no new States shall be formed, without the concurrence
of the federal authority, and that of the States concerned, is consonant to the
principles which ought to govern such transactions. The particular precaution
against the erection of new States, by the partition of a State without its
consent, quiets the jealousy of the larger States; as that of the smaller is
quieted by a like precaution, against a junction of States without their
consent.
5. "To dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States," with a proviso, that "nothing in the Constitution shall be so
construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular
State."
This is a power of very great importance, and required by
considerations similar to those which show the propriety of the former. The
proviso annexed is proper in itself, and was probably rendered absolutely
necessary by jealousies and questions concerning the Western territory
sufficiently known to the public.
6. "To guarantee to every State in the Union a
republican form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; and on
application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot
be convened), against domestic violence."
In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and
composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to
possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial
innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater
interest have the members in the political institutions of each other; and the
greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was
entered into should be
substantially maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where else
could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution?
Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a
federal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. "As the
confederate republic of Germany," says Montesquieu, "consists of free
cities and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us that
it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland." "Greece
was undone," he adds, "as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat
among the Amphictyons." In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate
force, as well as the monarchical form, of the new confederate, had its share of
influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of
such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in
the State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These
questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general government
should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless
superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be
produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising
leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second
question it may be answered, that if the general government should interpose by
virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course, bound to pursue
the authority. But the authority extends no further than to a guaranty
of a republican form of government, which supposes a pre-existing government of
the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing
republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal
Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican
forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the
latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange
republican for antirepublican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is
presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.
A protection against invasion is due from every society
to the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression here used seems to
secure each State, not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or
vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The history, both of
ancient and modern confederacies, proves that the weaker members of the union
ought not to be insensible to the policy of this article.
Protection against domestic violence is added with equal
propriety. It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss cantons, which,
properly speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this
object; and the history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently
claimed and afforded; and as well by the most democratic, as the other cantons.
A recent and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be prepared for
emergencies of a like nature.
At first view, it might seem not to square with the
republican theory, to suppose, either that a majority have not the right, or
that a minority will have the force, to subvert a government; and consequently,
that the federal interposition can never be required, but when it would be
improper. But theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be
qualified by the lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, for
purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a
small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and
if the authority of the State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local
magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the former, to support the State
authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are
so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given
to the one without communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a
State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in
them bear some proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better
that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power,
than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and
obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent
the necessity of exerting it.
Is it true that force and right are necessarily on the
same side in republican governments? May not the minor party possess such a
superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of
secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal
to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the scale on
the same side, against a superior number so situated as to be less capable of a
prompt and collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical
than to imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by
the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the
event of an election! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of citizens
may become a majority of persons, by the accession of alien residents,
of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the
State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy
species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of
regular government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous
scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a
superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves.
In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice
lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to
arms, and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate
States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges, they would
unite the affection of friends. Happy would it be if such a remedy for its
infirmities could be enjoyed by all free governments; if a project equally
effectual could be established for the universal peace of mankind!
Should it be asked, what is to be the redress for an
insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a superiority of the
entire force, though not a constitutional right? the answer must be, that such a
case, as it would be without the compass of human remedies, so it is fortunately
not within the compass of human probability; and that it is a sufficient
recommendation of the federal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a
calamity for which no possible constitution can provide a cure.
Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated
by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that should a popular insurrection
happen in one of the States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses
creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound."
7. "To consider all debts contracted, and
engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, as being no
less valid against the United States, under this Constitution, than under the
Confederation."
This can only be considered as a declaratory proposition;
and may have been inserted, among other reasons, for the satisfaction of the
foreign creditors of the United States, who cannot be strangers to the pretended
doctrine, that a change in the political form of civil society has the magical
effect of dissolving its moral obligations.
Among the lesser criticisms which have been exercised on
the Constitution, it has been remarked that the validity of engagements ought to
have been asserted in favor of the United States, as well as against them; and
in the spirit which usually characterizes little critics, the omission has been
transformed and magnified into a plot against the national rights. The authors
of this discovery may be told, what few others need to be informed of, that as
engagements are in their nature reciprocal, an assertion of their validity on
one side, necessarily involves a validity on the other side; and that as the
article is merely declaratory, the establishment of the principle in one case is
sufficient for every case. They may be further told, that every constitution
must limit its precautions to dangers that are not altogether imaginary; and
that no real danger can exist that the government would dare, with, or
even without, this constitutional declaration before it, to remit the debts
justly due to the public, on the pretext here condemned.
8. "To provide for amendments to be ratified by
three fourths of the States under two exceptions only."
That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could not but be
foreseen. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing them should
be provided. The mode preferred by the convention seems to be stamped with every
mark of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility, which would
render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might
perpetuate its discovered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the general and
the State governments to originate the amendment of errors, as they may be
pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the other. The exception in
favor of the equality of suffrage in the Senate, was probably meant as a
palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, implied and secured by
that principle of representation in one branch of the legislature; and was
probably insisted on by the States particularly attached to that equality. The
other exception must have been admitted on the same considerations which
produced the privilege defended by it.
9. "The ratification of the conventions of nine
States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between
the States, ratifying the same."
This article speaks for itself. The express authority of
the people alone could give due validity to the Constitution. To have required
the unanimous ratification of the thirteen States, would have subjected the
essential interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single
member. It would have marked a want of foresight in the convention, which our
own experience would have rendered inexcusable.
Two questions of a very delicate nature present
themselves on this occasion: 1. On what principle the Confederation, which
stands in the solemn form of a compact among the States, can be superseded
without the unanimous consent of the parties to it? 2. What relation is to
subsist between the nine or more States ratifying the Constitution, and the
remaining few who do not become parties to it?
The first question is answered at once by recurring to
the absolute necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservation;
to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the
safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political
institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed. Perhaps,
also, an answer may be found without searching beyond the principles of the
compact itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the
Confederation, that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction
than a mere legislative ratification. The principle of reciprocality seems to
require that its obligation on the other States should be reduced to the same
standard. A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of
legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty
between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties,
that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of
any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, committed by
either of the parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please,
to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to
appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the
consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact, will not the
complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the multiplied
and important infractions with which they may be confronted? The time
has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph
exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives
dictate.
The second question is not less delicate; and the
flattering prospect of its being merely hypothetical forbids an overcurious
discussion of it. It is one of those cases which must be left to provide for
itself. In general, it may be observed, that although no political relation can
subsist between the assenting and dissenting States, yet the moral relations
will remain uncancelled. The claims of justice, both on one side and on the
other, will be in force, and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity must in
all cases be duly and mutually respected; whilst considerations of a common
interest, and, above all, the remembrance of the endearing scenes which are
past, and the anticipation of a speedy triumph over the obstacles to reunion,
will, it is hoped, not urge in vain moderation on one side, and prudence
on the other.
PUBLIUS
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