The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
New York Packet Tuesday, March 25, 1788
[Alexander Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York:
THE
President of the United States is to be "commander-in-chief of the army and
navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called
into the actual service of the United States." The propriety of this
provision is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to
the precedents of the State constitutions in general, that little need be said
to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have, in other respects,
coupled the chief magistrate with a council, have for the most part concentrated
the military authority in him alone. Of all the cares or concerns of government,
the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish
the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the
direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the
common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the
executive authority.
"The President may require the opinion, in writing,
of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject
relating to the duties of their respective officers." This I consider as a
mere redundancy in the plan, as the right for which it provides would result of
itself from the office.
He is also to be authorized to grant "reprieves and
pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of
impeachment." Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the
benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or
embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary
severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate
guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense
of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may
be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of
those motives which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and
least apt to yield to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit
object of its vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature
depended on his sole fiat, would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution;
the dread of being accused of weakness or connivance, would beget equal
circumspection, though of a different kind. On the other hand, as men generally
derive confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage each other in
an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion
or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency. On these accounts, one man
appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government, than a body
of men.
The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the
President has, if I mistake not, been only contested in relation to the crime of
treason. This, it has been urged, ought to have depended upon the assent of one,
or both, of the branches of the legislative body. I shall not deny that there
are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the
concurrence of that body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime levelled at
the immediate being of the society, when the laws have once ascertained the
guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness in referring the expediency of an
act of mercy towards him to the judgment of the legislature. And this ought the
rather to be the case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief
Magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded. But there are also strong
objections to such a plan. It is not to be doubted, that a single man of
prudence and good sense is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance
the motives which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment,
than any numerous body whatever. It deserves particular attention, that treason
will often be connected with seditions which embrace a large proportion of the
community; as lately happened in Massachusetts. In every such case, we might
expect to see the representation of the people tainted with the same spirit
which had given birth to the offense. And when parties were pretty equally
matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers of the condemned
person, availing itself of the good-nature and weakness of others, might
frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was necessary. On the
other hand, when the sedition had proceeded from causes which had inflamed the
resentments of the major party, they might often be found obstinate and
inexorable, when policy demanded a conduct of forbearance and clemency. But the
principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case to the Chief
Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often
critical moments, when a welltimed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels
may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass
unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process
of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of
obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of
letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may
sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed, that a discretionary power, with a
view to such contingencies, might be occasionally conferred upon the President,
it may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable, whether, in a
limited Constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the second
place, that it would generally be impolitic beforehand to take any step which
might hold out the prospect of impunity. A proceeding of this kind, out of the
usual course, would be likely to be construed into an argument of timidity or of
weakness, and would have a tendency to embolden guilt.
PUBLIUS
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