A DEMOCRATIC VIEWPOINT: CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY

By Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

thin blue line


Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Presidents realize the importance of having Congress as a partner in the conduct of foreign policy, says Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., a Democrat from Delaware. "With congressional support, they know that they will be more confident and effective and that the American people will be behind them," he says.


Congress plays a crucial role in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. While the President by necessity takes the lead, the President and the Congress under our Constitution are co-equal branches of government, and the support of Congress on foreign policy is often essential to ensuring that a policy will succeed. If, by contrast, the Congress does not support a President's policy, or even is lukewarm in its support, it undercuts the policy and limits its success.

The allocation of foreign policy powers is only vaguely sketched in our Constitution. The Senate has the power to approve all treaties negotiated by the President, and must confirm ambassadors and other senior foreign policy officials. Congress retains control over foreign policy funding, and, of course, the power to raise and equip the military, and the power to declare war.

But these formal powers serve primarily as a starting point for Congress's participation. Because of the significance of foreign policy decisions, which often involve the potential for sending U.S. troops into combat, Congress over the years has carved out a more informal "oversight" role, part of the "checks and balances" that are central to the "shared power" among the three branches in our constitutional system.

Besides being largely informal, congressional power in foreign policy is not always exercised with the same degree of intensity. At times of relative peace on the world scene, such as the present, Congress's involvement can often be modest. At other times, such as during the Persian Gulf war, or during the conflicts in Central America during the 1980s, Congress is likely to get more actively involved, especially if there is significant disagreement with the President over policy.

Congress's role in approving or disapproving U.S. involvement in overseas military conflicts is the most significant issue at stake when considering the Congress's foreign policy powers. That is as it should be. The decision to send U.S. troops into harm's way should never be made by the President alone; the views of the American people should be expressed through their elected representatives in Congress.

Indeed, I believe the Constitution demands it. In my view, the framers of our Constitution intended that Congress authorize any use of force by the United States, with certain limited exceptions.

Congress does not always want to have the responsibility for such momentous decisions, however, and Presidents in the modern era have contended that their power as "Commander in Chief" vested them with unfettered power to take the country to war. Thus did President Truman take the country to war in Korea in 1950. (Although Congress did not formally declare war in the case of Vietnam, arguably it authorized it in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution).

The recent debate about the scope of the war power has yielded perpetual disagreement between the two branches. In 1973, Congress tried to clarify its role by approving, over President Richard Nixon's veto, the War Powers Resolution, which established a framework for authorizing uses of force, but in any event demanded that a use of force end after 60 days unless Congress had affirmatively authorized it. But no President since has recognized the authority of this resolution, arguing that it is an unconstitutional limitation on the President's power as commander in chief. Efforts to modify the resolution to meet these and other concerns have not borne fruit.

As a result of Congressional timidity, and Presidential assertiveness, in recent years Presidents have intervened overseas without an express authorization from Congress. The Persian Gulf war in 1991 was a rare example of Congress authorizing a military operation before it occurred, and only because I and other members of Congress strongly urged a reluctant President Bush to put the matter to a vote. (Bush's reluctance was borne out when the authorization carried by only a 52-47 vote margin in the Senate.)

More typical were Congress's deliberations on sending U.S. troops to Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In all those cases, one or both houses adopted resolutions giving rhetorical support to the U.S. troops and their mission, but Congress did not, in a formal legal sense, authorize the deployment.

Congress's "power of the purse" is a more reliable means of wielding foreign policy power. Every dollar spent by the Executive Branch must be appropriated by Congress, and it is common practice to use these spending bills to shape policy. Sometimes the process is formal and direct: Congress will stipulate that "no funds shall be used" to carry out a policy or activity that it opposes. On the positive side, it will "earmark" money for a certain program, to make sure the Executive Branch agency carries out its wishes. More often, Congress expresses its views less formally or directly. For example, members of Congress may introduce a bill to cut off funds for a foreign policy activity -- Bosnia was an example -- even though they know it will never be passed into law. Their point is: show the President that there is disagreement with the policy and perhaps persuade him to abandon the course of action.

Sanctions are a similar tool to express displeasure with a foreign policy; Congress will enact legislation restricting trade or other economic relations with a country whose policies it disagrees with. For example, Congress imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan because of their nuclear tests, and on numerous countries because of their involvement in drug trafficking. However, the same legislation will often give the President authority to lift the sanctions if he believes it to be in the national interest -- which he usually does.

As any visitor to Congress has experienced, another visible means Congress uses to exercise its foreign policy power is through oversight hearings at which officials from the Executive Branch are called before a Congressional committee to explain a policy in a particular area. This is a particularly useful device when Congress has no other appropriate means of influencing policy. By exposing a policy to public scrutiny and debate, hearings can reveal weaknesses in policy, as well as a lack of public support.

The most famous foreign policy hearings in recent memory were the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on Vietnam three decades ago. They were chaired by Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas and televised nationally. By exposing to millions of viewers the contradictions and difficulties of the U.S. effort in Vietnam, the Fulbright hearings were credited with helping to build public opinion against the war.

In similar fashion, the Iran-Contra hearings in 1987 showed the American people the contradictions in the Reagan Administration's policy of secretly selling arms to Iran -- hardly a government friendly to the United States -- in order to raise money for the rebels fighting the Communist government in Nicaragua. In the light of day, the policy was insupportable.

In my own experience as a Senator involved with U.S. foreign policy for most of my 28 years in the Senate, the most useful means of influencing U.S. foreign policy is the most informal method -- by direct and private discussions with the Secretary of State, the National Security Adviser, and even the President. The President knows he needs to seek support from Congress on any major foreign policy objective, especially if it is controversial. Presidents and their top aides in these instances reach out to senior members of the House and Senate to explain the policy and ask for support. It is in these informal discussions that Congress, through its individual members, probably has the most impact. During last year's NATO intervention in Kosovo, for example, I had almost daily private consultations with key members of the administration. This allowed me not only to follow the progress of the war closely, but also to critique the policy and suggest alternative courses of action.

Unlike in parliamentary systems, where the executive has almost unchallenged authority on overseas matters, the American constitutional system allows for a significant Congressional role in foreign policy. That role is not exercised through any one means, and the degree of Congressional involvement varies from time to time, depending on how contentious a policy has become. Despite the ambiguities and the uncertainties about Congress's role, even Presidents realize the importance of having Congress as a partner in the conduct of foreign policy. With Congressional support, they know that they will be more confident and effective and that the American people will be behind them.

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