

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A


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NUMBER 1

*Clinton and
Congress:
The
Challenges
Ahead*

March 1997



U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

Clinton and Congress: The Challenges Ahead

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

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“Fifty years ago, a farsighted America led in creating the institutions that secured victory in the Cold War and built a growing world economy. As a result, today more people than ever embrace our ideals and share our interests.... Now, we stand at another moment of change and choice — and another time to be farsighted — to bring America 50 more years of security and prosperity.”

With these words, President Clinton, in his annual State of the Union address, issued an appeal to the Republican-controlled U.S. Congress to work with him, over the next four years, in a spirit of bipartisanship to meet U.S. foreign policy goals for the 21st century.

Those goals — and the views of the administration and Congress on how to achieve them — are the subject of this journal. In the focus section, the president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and a National Security Council official outline administration foreign policy priorities, and three members of Congress who deal with foreign policy issues give their views on future directions for U.S. foreign policy. A leading scholar, in the commentary section, gives an outsider’s view of the problems involved in executive-legislative relations; and the major administration and congressional figures who deal with foreign policy are profiled in Key Players.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

*An Electronic Journal of the
U. S. Information Agency*

CLINTON AND CONGRESS: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

CONTENTS

◎ FOCUS

AMERICA'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE 21ST CENTURY	5
<i>By President William J. Clinton</i>	
BUILDING A NEW WORLD FRAMEWORK FOR DEMOCRACY	8
<i>By Secretary of State Madeleine Albright</i>	
U.S. MILITARY READINESS FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE	12
<i>Excerpts from remarks by Secretary of Defense William Cohen</i>	
SHAPING A BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY	15
<i>An interview with David Johnson Special Assistant to the President</i>	
UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION	20
<i>Excerpts from statements by Senator Jesse Helms</i>	
SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY TO FOSTER PEACE AND SECURITY	22
<i>An interview with Senator Paul Sarbanes</i>	
"STANDING UP FOR WHAT'S RIGHT" IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS	27
<i>An interview with Representative James Leach</i>	

◎ COMMENTARY

CLINTON, CONGRESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY: AN OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVE	31
<i>By Morton H. Halperin Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations</i>	

◎ THE KEY PLAYERS

PROFILES: TOP ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY OFFICIALS	35
PROFILES: KEY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS DEALING WITH FOREIGN POLICY	41
FACT SHEET: HEADS OF CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN POLICY COMMITTEES	46

© **A GUIDE TO ADDITIONAL READING**

CLINTON AND CONGRESS: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD — KEY INTERNET SITES	48
<i>Internet links to resources on the president, Congress, and foreign policy</i>	
CLINTON AND CONGRESS: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD — BIBLIOGRAPHY	49
<i>Spotlighting other views on the subject</i>	
CLINTON AND CONGRESS: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD — ARTICLE ALERT	50
<i>Abstracts of current articles</i>	

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

A G E N D A

AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

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USIA's electronic journals, published and transmitted worldwide at two-week intervals, examine major issues facing the United States and the international community. The journals — Economic Perspectives, Global Issues, Issues of Democracy, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, and U.S. Society and Values — provide analysis, commentary, and background information in their thematic areas. French and Spanish language versions appear one week after the English. The opinions expressed in the journals do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government. Articles may be reproduced and translated outside the United States unless copyright restrictions are cited on the articles.

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AMERICA'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

By President William J. Clinton

The president's foreign policy priorities for the next four years are outlined in this excerpt from his annual State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress on February 4, 1997.

To prepare America for the 21st century we must master the forces of change in the world and keep American leadership strong and sure for an uncharted time.

Fifty years ago, a farsighted America led in creating the institutions that secured victory in the Cold War and built a growing world economy. As a result, today more people than ever embrace our ideals and share our interests. Already, we have dismantled many of the blocs and barriers that divided our parents' world. For the first time, more people live under democracy than dictatorship, including every nation in our own hemisphere but one — and its day, too, will come.

Now, we stand at another moment of change and choice — and another time to be farsighted — to bring America 50 more years of security and prosperity. In this endeavor, our first task is to help to build, for the first time, an undivided, democratic Europe. When Europe is stable, prosperous, and at peace, America is more secure.

To that end, we must expand NATO by 1999, so that countries that were once our adversaries can become our allies. At the special NATO summit this summer, that is what we will begin to do. We must strengthen NATO's Partnership for Peace with non-member allies. And we must build a stable partnership between NATO and a democratic Russia. An expanded NATO is good for America. And a Europe in which all democracies define their future not in terms of what they can do to each other, but in terms of what they can do together for the good of all — that kind of Europe is good for America.

Second, America must look to the East no less than to the West. Our security demands it. Americans fought three wars in Asia in this century. Our prosperity requires it. More than two million American jobs depend upon trade with Asia.

There, too, we are helping to shape an Asian Pacific community of cooperation, not conflict. Let our progress there not mask the peril that remains. Together with South Korea, we must advance peace talks with North Korea and bridge the Cold War's last divide. And I call on Congress to fund our share of the agreement under which North Korea must continue to freeze and then dismantle its nuclear weapons program.

We must pursue a deeper dialogue with China — for the sake of our interests and our ideals. An isolated China is not good for America. A China playing its proper role in the world is. I will go to China, and I have invited China's President to come here, not because we agree on everything, but because engaging China is the best way to work on our common challenges like ending nuclear testing, and to deal frankly with our fundamental differences like human rights.

The American people must prosper in the global economy. We've worked hard to tear down trade barriers abroad so that we can create good jobs at home. I am proud to say that today, America is once again the most competitive nation and the number one exporter in the world.

Now we must act to expand our exports, especially to Asia and Latin America — two of the fastest

growing regions on Earth — or be left behind as these emerging economies forge new ties with other nations. That is why we need the authority now to conclude new trade agreements that open markets to our goods and services even as we preserve our values.

We need not shrink from the challenge of the global economy. After all, we have the best workers and the best products. In a truly open market, we can out-compete anyone, anywhere on Earth.

But this is about more than economics. By expanding trade, we can advance the cause of freedom and democracy around the world. There is no better example of this truth than Latin America where democracy and open markets are on the march together. That is why I will visit there in the spring to reinforce our important ties.

We should all be proud that America led the effort to rescue our neighbor, Mexico, from its economic crises. And we should all be proud that last month Mexico repaid the United States — three full years ahead of schedule — with half a billion dollar profit to us.

America must continue to be an unrelenting force for peace — from the Middle East to Haiti, from Northern Ireland to Africa. Taking reasonable risks for peace keeps us from being drawn into far more costly conflicts later. With American leadership, the killing has stopped in Bosnia. Now the habits of peace must take hold. The new NATO force will allow reconstruction and reconciliation to accelerate. Tonight, I ask Congress to continue its strong support for our troops. They are doing a remarkable job there for America, and America must do right by them.

Fifth, we must move strongly against new threats to our security. In the past four years, we led the way to a worldwide agreement to ban nuclear testing. With Russia, we dramatically cut nuclear arsenals and we stopped targeting each other's citizens. We are acting to prevent nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands and to rid the world of landmines. We are working with

other nations with renewed intensity to fight drug traffickers and to stop terrorists before they act, and hold them fully accountable if they do.

Now, we must rise to a new test of leadership: ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. Make no mistake about it, it will make our troops safer from chemical attack; it will help us to fight terrorism. We have no more important obligations — especially in the wake of what we now know about the Gulf War. This treaty has been bipartisan from the beginning — supported by Republican and Democratic administrations and Republican and Democratic members of Congress — and already approved by 68 nations.

But if we do not act by April the 29th — when this convention goes into force, with or without us — we will lose the chance to have Americans leading and enforcing this effort. Together we must make the Chemical Weapons Convention law, so that at last we can begin to outlaw poison gas from the Earth.

Finally, we must have the tools to meet all these challenges. We must maintain a strong and ready military. We must increase funding for weapons modernization by the year 2000, and we must take good care of our men and women in uniform. They are the world's finest.

We must also renew our commitment to America's diplomacy, and pay our debts and dues to international financial institutions like the World Bank, and to a reforming United Nations. Every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, to promoting democracy, to stopping the spread of disease and starvation, brings a sure return in security and savings. Yet international affairs spending today is just one percent of the federal budget — a small fraction of what America invested in diplomacy to choose leadership over escapism at the start of the Cold War. If America is to continue to lead the world, we here who lead America simply must find the will to pay our way.

A farsighted America moved the world to a better place over these last 50 years. And so it can be for

another 50 years. But a shortsighted America will soon find its words falling on deaf ears all around the world.

Almost exactly 50 years ago, in the first winter of the Cold War, President Truman stood before a Republican Congress and called upon our country to meet its responsibilities of leadership. This was his warning — he said, “If we falter, we may endanger the peace of the world, and we shall

surely endanger the welfare of this nation.” That Congress, led by Republicans like Senator Arthur Vandenberg, answered President Truman’s call. Together, they made the commitments that strengthened our country for 50 years.

Now let us do the same. Let us do what it takes to remain the indispensable nation — to keep America strong, secure, and prosperous for another 50 years. ©

BUILDING A NEW WORLD FRAMEWORK FOR DEMOCRACY

By Secretary of State Madeleine Albright

The United States “must continue building a new world framework — adapted to the demands of a new century — that will protect our citizens and our friends, reinforce our values, and secure our future,” says Albright. The central elements of that framework are described in the following article, which is excerpted from the secretary’s prepared testimony at her confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1997.

We have reached a point more than halfway between the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the start of a new century. Our nation is respected and at peace. Our alliances are vigorous. Our economy is strong. And from the distant corners of Asia, to the emerging democracies of Central Europe and Africa, to the community of democracies that exists within our own hemisphere — and to the one impermanent exception to that community, Castro’s Cuba — American institutions and ideals are a model for those who have, or who aspire to, freedom.

All this is no accident, and its continuation is by no means inevitable. Democratic progress must be sustained as it was built — by American leadership. And our leadership must be sustained if our interests are to be protected around the world.

Today, it is not enough for us to say that Communism has failed. We must continue building a new framework — adapted to the demands of a new century — that will protect our citizens and our friends; reinforce our values; and secure our future. In so doing, we must direct our energies, not as our predecessors did, against a single virulent ideology. We face a variety of threats, some as old as ethnic conflict; some as new as letter bombs; some as long-term as global warming; some as dangerous as nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands.

To cope with such a variety of threats, we will need a full range of foreign policy tools. That is why

our armed forces must remain the best-led, best-trained, best-equipped, and most respected in the world. And as President Clinton has pledged, and our military leaders ensure, they will.

It is also why we need first-class diplomacy. Force, and the credible possibility of its use, are essential to defend our vital interests and to keep America safe. But force alone can be a blunt instrument, and there are many problems it cannot solve.

To be effective, force and diplomacy must complement and reinforce each other. For there will be many occasions, in many places, where we will rely on diplomacy to protect our interests, and we will expect our diplomats to defend those interests with skill, knowledge, and spine.

One of my most important tasks will be to work with Congress to ensure that we have the superb diplomatic representation that our people deserve and our interests demand. We cannot have that on the cheap. We must invest the resources needed to maintain American leadership. Consider the stakes. We are talking here about one percent of our federal budget, but that one percent may well determine 50 percent of the history that is written about our era.

In addition, I want to work with Congress to spur continued reform and to pay our bills at the United Nations, an organization that Americans helped create, that reflects ideals that we share and that serves goals of stability, law, and international cooperation that are in our interests.

Any framework for American leadership must include measures to control the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and terror; to seize the opportunities that exist for settling dangerous regional conflicts; to maintain America as the hub of an expanding global economy; and to defend cherished principles of democracy and law.

At the center of that framework, however, are our key alliances and relationships. These are the bonds that hold together not only our foreign policy, but the entire international system.

A foremost example is the trans-Atlantic partnership. It is a central lesson of this century that America must remain a European power, and today, thanks to the efforts of President Clinton and Secretary Christopher, American leadership in Europe is on solid ground.

In July, at the NATO summit in Madrid, the alliance will discuss European security, including NATO adaptation to new missions and structures, a framework for enhanced consultation and cooperation with Russia, and enlargement.

The purpose of enlargement is to do for Europe's east what NATO did 50 years ago for Europe's west: to integrate new democracies, defeat old hatreds, provide confidence in economic recovery, and deter conflict.

Those who say NATO enlargement should wait until a military threat appears miss the main point. NATO is not a wild west posse that we mobilize only when grave danger is near. It is a permanent alliance, a linchpin of stability, designed to prevent serious threats from ever arising.

To those who worry about enlargement dividing Europe, I say that NATO cannot and should not preserve the old Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier. That was an artificial division, imposed upon proud nations, some of which are now ready to contribute to the continent's security.

What NATO must and will do is keep open the door to membership to every European nation that

can shoulder alliance responsibilities and contribute to its goals, while building a strong and enduring partnership with all of Europe's democracies.

A democratic Russia can and must be a strong partner in building a more cooperative and integrated Europe. President Yeltsin's challenge in his second term will be to restore the momentum behind internal reforms and accelerate Russia's integration with the West. We have a profound interest in encouraging that great country to remain on a democratic course, to respect fully the sovereignty of its neighbors, and to join with us in addressing a full range of regional and global issues.

The future of European stability and democracy depends, as well, on continued implementation of the Dayton Accords.

Today, in Bosnia, virtually every nation in Europe is working together to bring stability to a region where conflict earlier this century tore the continent apart. This reflects a sharp departure from the spheres of influence or balance of power diplomacy of the past, and an explicit rejection of politics based on ethnic identification. And it validates the premise of the Partnership for Peace by demonstrating the growth of a common understanding within Europe of how a common sense of security may be achieved.

America must remain a European power. We must, and will, remain a Pacific power, as well.

Asia is a continent undergoing breathtaking economic expansion and measured, but steady, movement in the direction of democracy. Its commercial vigor reinforces our own and contributes to the vital interest we have in its security. President Clinton has elevated this dynamic region on our agenda, and I plan to devote much of my attention to its promise and perils.

Our priorities here are to maintain the strength of our core alliances while successfully managing our multi-faceted relationship with China.

A strong bilateral relationship between the United States and China is needed to expand areas of cooperation, reduce the potential for misunderstanding, and encourage China's full emergence as a responsible member of the international community.

To make progress, our two countries must act towards each other on the basis of mutual frankness. We have important differences, especially on trade, arms transfers, and human rights, including Tibet. We have concerns about Chinese policy towards the reversion of Hong Kong. While adhering to our one China policy, we will maintain robust unofficial ties with Taiwan. But we also have many interests in common, and have worked together on issues including the Korean peninsula, crime, the global environment, and nuclear testing.

The Cold War may be over, but the threat to our security posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction has only been reduced, not ended. Arms control and nonproliferation remain a vital element in our foreign policy framework.

First, we will be asking for Senate consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC, before it enters into force in late April.

Overseas, we will be working with Russia to secure prompt ratification by the Duma of the START II Treaty, and then to pursue further reductions and limits on strategic nuclear arms.

We will also continue efforts to fulfill the President's call for negotiations leading to a worldwide ban on the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.

During the past four years, under President Clinton and Secretary Christopher, the United States has been steadfast in supporting the peacemakers over the bombthrowers in historically troubled areas of the globe. Our goal has been to build an environment in which threats to our security and that of our allies are diminished, and the likelihood of American forces being sent into combat is reduced.

We recognize that, in most of these situations, neither the United States nor any other outside force can impose a solution. But we can make it easier for those inclined towards peace to take the risks required to achieve it.

In the Middle East, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat have reaffirmed to President Clinton their determination to continue their joint efforts for peace. The United States will stand by them as they do.

Across the Mediterranean in Cyprus, another longstanding disagreement remains unresolved. We are prepared in this new year to play a heightened role in promoting a resolution in Cyprus, but for any initiative to bear fruit, the parties must agree to steps that will reduce tensions and make direct negotiations possible.

In Northern Ireland, we are encouraged that multi-party talks began but we are disappointed by the lack of progress made, and strongly condemn the IRA's return to violence. We will continue to work with the Irish and British governments and the parties to help promote substantive progress in the talks.

As we enter the 50th anniversary year of independence for both India and Pakistan, we will again consider the prospects for reducing the tensions that have long existed between these two friends of the United States. We have a wealth of equities in this region, and a particular concern about the regional arms race and nuclear nonproliferation. India and Pakistan should both know that we will do what we can to strengthen their relations with us and encourage better relations between them, and that we expect both to avoid actions calculated to provoke the other.

Another dispute tangled by history and geography concerns Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The good news here is that the ceasefire has now held for more than two years. The bad news is that progress under the OSCE's

Minsk process has been agonizingly slow. We have very substantial economic, political, and humanitarian interests in this region, and are prepared to play a more visible role in helping to arrange a settlement. One step that Congress could take to increase our influence would be to lift restrictions on nonmilitary assistance to Azerbaijan, while maintaining support for our generous aid program in Armenia.

Finally, in Central Africa, we are striving with regional leaders and our allies to prevent a still-volatile situation from erupting into even greater tragedy.

One practical step we can take is to increase the capacity of African countries to engage successfully in peacekeeping efforts within their region. That is the purpose of the African Crisis Response Force proposed by the administration last fall. This proposal has generated considerable interest both within and outside the region. With congressional support, it will be a priority in the coming year.

In the years ahead, we must continue shaping a global economic system that works for America. Because our people are so productive and inventive, we will thrive in any true competition. However, maintaining the equity of the system requires constant effort. Experience tells us that there will always be some who will seek to take advantage by denying access to our products, pirating our copyrighted goods, or under-pricing us through sweatshop labor.

That is why our diplomacy will continue to emphasize high standards on working conditions, the environment, and labor and business practices. And it is why we will work for a trading system that establishes and enforces fair rules.

Although we will continue to work closely with our G-7 partners, the benefits of economic integration and expanded trade are not — and should not be — limited to the most developed nations. Especially now, when our bilateral foreign assistance program is in decline, public and private sector economic initiatives are everywhere an important part of our foreign policy. We can also leverage resources for results by working with and supporting the international financial institutions.

In Latin America, a region of democracies, we will be building on the 1994 Summit of the Americas to strengthen judicial and other political institutions and to promote higher standards of living through free trade and economic integration.

It is encouraging that many African governments are facilitating growth through policies that allow private enterprise to take hold. We will work towards the integration of Africa into the world's economy, participate in efforts to ease debt burdens, and help deserving countries, where we can, through targeted programs of bilateral aid.

These are some, but by no means all, of what I see as the principal challenges and opportunities we will face over the next four years. Clearly, we have a lot to do.

By rejecting the temptations of isolation, and by standing with those around the world who share our values, we will advance our own interests; honor our best traditions; and help to answer the prayer for peace, freedom, food on the table, and what President Clinton once so eloquently referred to as “the quiet miracle of a normal life.” ●

U.S. MILITARY READINESS FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Excerpts of written statements by Secretary of Defense William Cohen

U.S. military forces in the 21st century must be prepared to face a wide range of security challenges, including some that cannot now be foreseen but that “probably will emerge,” says Cohen. The United States, he says, must harness “advanced technologies, particularly information technology... to enable our future joint forces to achieve the capability to dominate an adversary across the full range of military operations.” Following are excerpts from the written answers that Cohen provided to questions submitted to him in January by members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

QUESTION: What do you see as the most significant military threats to the United States over the next 20 years and what is necessary to prepare U.S. military forces to meet these threats?

COHEN: There will continue to be regionally based dangers such as attempted coercion against U.S. allies, friends, or interests, or localized instability that threatens our interests. For the near term, both Iraq and North Korea continue to pose an immediate threat to allies and friends. Also, the proliferation of advanced technologies, especially nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them, will be a significant and increasing threat to the United States and our allies.

In addition, there are other trends that may provide additional challenges for the United States. There is a potential for increased competition among major powers as many major nations continue to grow economically and increase their military potential. There is also an increase in transnational threats posed by international organized crime, terrorism, and international drug trafficking.

Moreover, we will need to remain wary of potential threats to the U.S. homeland. Although the nuclear threat to U.S. territory has significantly diminished since the end of the Cold War, we must be cautious of the extant nuclear arsenals in Russia and in China and weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states and terrorist organizations.

We must also remain cognizant of the fact that threats now unforeseen can and probably will emerge.

Q: What will be your defense budget priorities and how will they differ from the current ones?

COHEN: [Former Defense] Secretary Perry’s priorities in developing his [Fiscal Year 1998] budget strategy have been: completing the drawdown successfully without losing military capability or readiness; protecting our personnel through adequate pay and quality of life; and shifting resources to modernization as savings are realized through downsizing and efficiency.

In very general terms, I support those priorities, while recognizing that, as the drawdown is completed, emphasis must shift to modernization.

Q: The Bottom-Up Review [a reexamination of U.S. strategy and force structure undertaken in 1993 by then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin] is based on a military strategy of U.S. forces being capable of fighting two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs). Is there an alternative strategy which you intend to consider?

COHEN: The [Defense] Department is in the midst of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which, among other things, is examining alternative defense strategies. This part of the review is not looking only at MRCs, but is addressing the array of challenges to the United

States in the international security environment. These challenges range from smaller-scale contingencies such as shows of force and non-combatant evacuation operations to large scale theater warfare and the potential rise of a major security competitor in 10 to 15 years.

Q: In the past, the Defense Department planned its research to meet the sophisticated “threats” that it saw as part of the Cold War. Many believe that this threat-based model has little relevance in the post-Cold War era that has evolved in the past few years. What would your priorities be for future research?

COHEN: How wisely we invest in research today will greatly influence the readiness of our future forces to succeed when called to protect our national interests. In fact, the technology that is fueling today’s revolution in military affairs is in large part a product of past research investments. In addition to deterring conflict, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and being capable of quick, decisive victory with minimum casualties on future battlefields, our military must also succeed at operations other than war. The post-Cold War period has been very unpredictable. The 21st century forecast is equally uncertain. One thing is certain, however: Our ability to deal with this uncertainty successfully will be greatly determined by the options and concepts produced by our investment in research.

Q: How would you assess the U.S. response to the revolution in military affairs to date and the Department’s plans to respond in the future?

COHEN: Research advances (such as the microprocessor, supercomputer, wireless telecommunications, advanced materials, and sensors) have produced revolutionary capabilities (such as stealth, smart weapons, the global positioning system, and space-based surveillance) that fundamentally alter the character and conduct of military operations.

The [Joint Chiefs of Staff] Chairman’s Joint Vision 2010 counts on leveraging advanced technologies,

particularly information technology, to produce four new operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and focused joint logistics. These new operational concepts combine to enable our future joint forces to achieve the capability to dominate an adversary across the full range of military operations.

We must reduce the cycle time from technology maturity to fielded capability. This is particularly true for harnessing the telecommunications revolution. We need to continuously improve our information system through technology insertion. When information technology turns over every two years, we cannot expect to modernize our military information systems if we follow the Cold War acquisition process that took 10 to 15 years to field a weapon system. This is a major objective of the ongoing acquisition reforms.

The visions for 2010 depend upon our ability to field superior technology to achieve the required total force dominance capable of swift, decisive victory with minimal casualties. Maintaining an adequate level of research and development spending is essential to the realization of this vision.

Q: The question as to whether and when U.S. forces should participate in potentially dangerous situations, including participation in United Nations peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations, is probably the most important and difficult decision that the national command authorities have to make. What is your criteria for such decisions?

COHEN: I believe use of force decisions should hinge on the national interests at stake in a given situation and whether those interests justify the costs and risks of employing military forces.

There are three basic categories of national interests that can merit the use of U.S. military forces: vital, important, and humanitarian. Vital interests are the defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies, and their economic well being. The United

States will do whatever it takes to defend these interests. Examples include the defeat of Iraqi aggression in Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm and the rapid responses to Iraqi military provocation undertaken in Operations Vigilant Warrior (October 1994) and Vigilant Sentinel (October 1995). At times, defending vital interests may require the unilateral and decisive use of military power.

Important, but not vital, U.S. interests are those that do not affect our national survival or well-being, but do affect Americans' quality of life and the character of the world in which we live. In such cases, military forces should only be used if they advance U.S. interests, have clearly defined and achievable objectives, the costs and risks of their employment are justified by the interests at stake, and the other means have been tried and have failed to achieve U.S. objectives. Such uses of

force to accomplish limited objectives should reflect the relative importance of the interests at stake.

Finally, the United States may choose to use military forces, though likely not force, to promote humanitarian interests. Generally, the military is not the most appropriate tool to address humanitarian concerns, but under certain conditions, the use of U.S. military forces may be appropriate: when a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond; when the need for relief is urgent and only the military can provide an immediate response, allowing civilian agencies time to undertake the longer-term response to the disaster; when the response requires resources unique to the military; and when the risk to U.S. troops is minimal. ©

SHAPING A BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY

*An interview with David Johnson
Special Assistant to the President*

“The president is determined to work with the Congress to craft a bipartisan foreign policy” that favors “engagement of America abroad,” says Johnson. The Clinton administration, he notes, is now beginning to “reap some of the benefits” of its past foreign policy efforts, which should enable the president, in his second term, to “set the architecture of security and economic policy for America for many years to come.” Johnson has served in the White House since September 1995 as special assistant to the president, White House deputy press secretary for foreign affairs, and senior director for public affairs of the National Security Council. A career Foreign Service officer, he formerly served as the State Department’s deputy spokesman and director of the Department’s Office of Press Relations, and has held several other diplomatic posts. The interview was conducted by Contributing Editor Wendy S. Ross.

QUESTION: Have President Clinton’s views on foreign policy changed since he was first elected four years ago?

JOHNSON: I don’t think they have changed. I think he has recognized and articulated, since the very beginning, that the notion that there is a separation between foreign policy and domestic policy is just no longer true. Americans work in a global economy, and what they can purchase, what their job opportunities are, really what their security is, is determined by how effectively we manage our nation’s foreign policy. The same is true in terms of economic policy. President Clinton created a National Economic Council in the White House — a counterpart to the National Security Council, sharing a lot of the same staff resources — that allows him to coordinate the work of his economic agencies — both those that are responsible for doing things strictly abroad and those at home — so they can more effectively protect and advance the interests of the American people.

One thing that has changed is that some of the work that the president has done on foreign policy issues has begun to bear fruit, and we are going to start to reap some of the benefits. In Bosnia, the president worked to create a policy with our

European allies to address the problem of genocide. The introduction of the Implementation Force and now the Stabilization Force, and the diplomatic work that has been coupled with that, have given the people of Bosnia hope. The problem is not solved, but it’s being worked on. The President also has created an effective partnership with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and he’s worked hard to create the broad institutions of a post-Cold War world, which will result this summer in Madrid in invitations to several countries to join an expanded, modernized NATO.

These types of things — reaping the rewards of having taken some hard decisions during the first term — are going to allow him, during his second term, to do some different things that will set the architecture of security and economic policy for America for many years to come.

Q: Do you foresee bipartisan agreement in the next four years on the need for a strong foreign policy?

JOHNSON: The president is determined to work with the Congress to craft a bipartisan foreign policy. He made a very strong push for that in his State of the Union address, in which he clearly laid out his priorities and set down his specific goals

over the next several weeks and months. You will see him going up to Capitol Hill to meet with the Senate and House leadership to discuss our foreign policy priorities and to craft, with the legislators, a solid way to represent and defend the interests of the United States.

I think the fact that foreign policy wasn't an issue in last year's campaign didn't mean that it wasn't important. It meant that the big question — whether America should be engaged in the world or should withdraw — has been largely decided by both parties in favor of engagement. Now we will be working with the Congress to figure out just how to do that. It doesn't mean there will be any less argument or that there will be any less passion to the arguments, but I think it's important to recognize that we will be working on a bipartisan basis with a Congress that largely has decided in favor of engagement of America abroad in order to protect the interests of American citizens.

Q: You have mentioned the importance of NATO enlargement to the administration. What are your expectations for the summit in July and also for U.S. relations with Russia?

JOHNSON: The United States firmly believes that Russia plays a very significant role in how we organize European security for the future. A relationship between NATO and the Russian federation, what we've come to call a charter, is the appropriate way to ensure that is true. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana has begun discussions with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov toward that end. It is a work in progress and it's going to require work, and we believe it is something that is very much in the best interests of the United States and NATO and in the best interests of Russia.

Regarding NATO expansion, we believe that an expanding NATO can play the role in Central Europe that NATO played in Western Europe when NATO was founded, and that is to provide real stability and security and to help these countries continue to deal with some of the longstanding rivalries they have among themselves.

I think even the prospect of membership already is beginning to bear some fruit. We have seen an agreement between Romania and Hungary on some minority and territorial issues that have been a feature of their political life over scores of years, and you see Germany and the Czech Republic discussing a post-World War II reconciliation agreement. Those types of issues are things that the prospect of NATO enlargement — and the prospect of expanding all the European institutions, certainly including the European Union — is bringing to the area. We believe that is very worthwhile and very much in the interest of the United States.

We have seen in Bosnia what instability can bring, and while we certainly are not predicting it for any of the rest of Europe, it's a lesson we all should take to heart and look for ways to prevent. In Madrid on the 8th and 9th of July, when NATO heads of state and government gather, we believe that decisions will be taken to select new members for accession talks and begin the process for negotiations that will eventually result in an expanded NATO. We also hope that at that time we will be able to have a charter between NATO and Russia. And we also believe that that's the appropriate time for us to formalize the adaptation and modernization of some of the internal structures of NATO. So there are a lot of issues that could come together in Madrid, and we firmly believe that expansion will be part of it.

Q: In the president's State of the Union address, he talked about a trip to China. What are U.S. priorities in Asia?

JOHNSON: The president believes very strongly that it is important for the United States to engage China, that it's important for China not to be isolated. China needs to be part of the international community. We can work together where we have common interests — for example, security on the Korean Peninsula or the non-proliferation treaty, areas where we have worked together very productively; and we also need to talk government to government about those issues where we have significant disagreements, like human rights.

Our relationship in Asia is a very broad one. The president looks to the Pacific as a part of the world that the United States is intimately related to. We have a vibrant Asia-Pacific community in the United States; this is a part of our heritage that makes us a stronger nation.

We have a very strong, enduring relationship with Japan, which was renewed in a significant way last April when we reaffirmed our defense relationship, renewing the U.S.-Japan Security Agreement and working out a new arrangement for our forces on Okinawa. The president has developed a very intense relationship with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto that I think has made the issues between the United States and Japan much easier to deal with, because we don't just deal with them at a bureaucratic level, or a diplomatic level, or a security level; we deal with them both from the bottom up and from the top down, and that's the kind of relationship that is most productive, particularly with a long-term ally such as Japan.

We also have a strong relationship with our ally, the Republic of Korea — one where we have worked together to try to bring greater security and stability to the peninsula. We've worked together to freeze the North Korea nuclear program and eventually to dismantle it. We've made some progress; it is a positive trend line, but it is one that requires a lot of continuing work.

The economic interchange between the United States and Southeast Asia has been growing by leaps and bounds. It's a tremendous asset for us in terms of a market, as well as for the Southeast Asian nations, who, I believe, appreciate the stability and the security that the continued presence of the United States provides in that area. We have about 100,000 troops in the Pacific, and I think the nations of Southeast Asia and the region as a whole see the United States as part of the stability that allows them to have the prosperity they are so clearly enjoying.

We have a very good partner in Australia. The president very much enjoyed his visit there. Being both immigrant countries we have a lot of

common challenges and outlooks on life, and there was a real fine opportunity there not only to talk about where the relationship is going but also to enjoy some of the outdoors in Australia and to talk about the environment, which means so much to President Clinton.

We have a number of strong relationships in the region, but the fact is that when the president came into office, people really didn't perceive the Pacific Basin as a community. I think that began to change when the president used the opportunity of hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders meeting at Blake Island, near Seattle, to create this notion of a Pacific community. Now it's something that is completely taken for granted. When we consult with our Pacific partners, we talk about a Pacific community. This is a real opportunity the president has seen and seized in a way his predecessors did not.

Q: I understand that the president is going to Mexico in April and to Barbados, Costa Rica, Brazil, and Argentina in May. Why has he chosen Latin America for his first foreign trips of his second term.

JOHNSON: The president very much wanted to go to Latin America during his first term in office. For a variety of reasons that was simply not possible, and he wanted to remedy that. Mexico is our third largest trading partner and our second largest export market, and the cultural ties between the United States and Mexico are vast. It is a rich relationship, but it is also one where we have problems, and this visit will be an opportunity to try to talk about those, and talk about how we can work together with Mexico and Canada, as our partners in free trade now, in order to extend that relationship further into Latin America.

The visit to Barbados, where he will meet with Caribbean leaders, is a serious and significant stop. He wants to meet, in Costa Rica, with the leaders of the countries of Central America to talk with them about the amazing transformation that has taken place there over the past several years. The

longest running civil war in Central America has just ended, and Guatemala has a bright future in front of it, as do all of the countries in Central America.

The president wants to talk to the people in Brazil and Argentina about his vision for a Latin America-American partnership where we work together on issues of common interest. The Summit of the Americas Initiative is a very significant one. Also, it is very important that the president has appointed one of his closest friends and advisers, Mack McLarty, to be his special envoy for the Americas.

Q: Moving to another part of the world, what do you see as the prospects now for the Middle East peace process?

JOHNSON: The president is exploring with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Jordan's King Hussein, and Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat how they believe the Mideast peace process can be moved forward. I think we see the opportunity for further progress, but it's not something one sees happening quickly. But again, if you look back over the past four years, the successes the president and his negotiators have achieved are truly remarkable. We have the prospect, if we continue to work hard and with the goodwill of the parties, to succeed during the next few years.

Q: The administration has stated that the proposed African Crisis Response Force will be an administration priority in the coming year. What does the administration hope to accomplish?

JOHNSON: This would be a force made up of Africans that could address regional problems within Africa; it is still in the discussion stage. We've seen over the past several years that there are problems that arise in Africa that need an African response to them; they are very difficult to respond to from Europe and North America. What we can do is provide equipment, training, and a lot of political help to such a force, and it could in the

future play a very strong role in the region in terms of helping to provide security and stability that could allow the development Africa so desperately needs.

Q: What are the administration's plans for working with the United Nations in pursuing U.S. foreign policy goals and particularly on the issue of U.N. reform and the payment of U.S. back dues to the world body?

JOHNSON: The president is very excited about having a new secretary general of the United Nations who is going to lead the reform effort. The United States is by far the largest contributor to the United Nations. In addition to what we provide directly in terms of funding, the work that we do abroad with our military forces, with our diplomatic efforts, supports the United Nations in ways that other countries simply are not in a position to do. We believe that the United Nations is what the military calls a force multiplier. When we work with the world community, we can multiply the resources that we have, material or political, to help solve problems. Whether we are talking about narcotics, terrorism, or real threats to peace and stability in various parts of the world, often the U.N. can do things that by ourselves would be very difficult, or very expensive, to do.

What we need is a United Nations that is not bloated, not over-bureaucratized, but one that is organized leanly to confront the problems of the 21st century. We believe Secretary General Kofi Annan really has a lot of promise for doing that, and we intend to do everything we can to support that effort.

Q: What about payment of U.S. back dues to the United Nations?

JOHNSON: What we want to do is to work with the U.N. We don't want to provide funds to an organization that is wasting money. We want to use the process of paying those back dues in order to move reform along, to be a spur and a catalyst to move reform in a positive direction.

Q: How will the administration work with the Senate to obtain its consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) before it enters into force on April 29?

JOHNSON: We believe the CWC has to be dealt with on a bipartisan basis, and we are engaged in a dialogue on it with members of the Senate. U.S. ratification of the convention by the time it goes into force will allow us to help organize it, to help set up the inspection procedures, to be there first to provide what we believe will be the best possible influence. This has been a Republican and Democratic project for years — negotiated by the Reagan administration, supported by Democratic and Republican administrations, supported by Republican and Democratic congressmen and senators, and it's something we believe is very much in the best interest of the American people. We are determined to work with the Senate to do whatever we can to move this process forward.

Q: Besides the CWC, what are the other major U.S. priorities in the area of arms control?

JOHNSON: There are two sets of major priorities that I would cite. One would be to continue our work with Russia to get START II ratified in the Russian parliament and to implement that agreement, which would significantly reduce the nuclear arms in our arsenal and in Russia's arsenal, and then, after that is done, to think about even further reductions.

The second thing that I would cite is our determination to work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva to achieve the president's objective for a worldwide ban on anti-personnel landmines. We hope, by using the CD, to make this a universal ban, where we don't just have an agreement among like-minded states who wouldn't be exporting these mines anyway, but we capture all the nations that might be exporting or potentially might be tempted to use these so-called hidden killers. ©

UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Excerpts from statements by Senator Jesse Helms

In the following statements, Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expresses his views on two foreign policy issues to which he gives high priority — United Nations reform and the Chemical Weapons Convention. The first statement is excerpted from an article he wrote for the September/October 1996 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, the second and third from a letter and memo he sent to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott on January 29, 1997.

FORCING CHANGE AT THE UNITED NATIONS

The time has come for the United States to deliver an ultimatum: Either the United Nations reforms, quickly and dramatically, or the United States will end its participation. For too long, the Clinton administration has paid lip service to the idea of U.N. reform, without imposing any real costs for U.N. failure to do so. I am convinced that without the threat of American withdrawal, nothing will change. Withholding U.S. contributions has not worked. In 1986, Congress passed the Kassebaum-Solomon bill, which said to the United Nations in clear and unmistakable terms, reform or die. That did not work. A decade later, the United Nations has neither reformed nor died. The time has come for it to do one or the other.

Legislation has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Joe Scarborough (Republican, Florida) for the United States to withdraw from the United Nations and replace it with a league of democracies. This idea has merit. If the United Nations is not clearly on the path of real reform well before the year 2000, then I believe the United States should withdraw. We must not enter the new millennium with the current U.N. structure in place. The United States has a responsibility to lay out what is wrong with the United Nations, what the benchmarks for adequate reform are, and what steps we are willing to take if those benchmarks are not met by a date certain.

The United Nations will certainly resist any and all reform — particularly many of the smaller and less developed members, which benefit from the current system and gain influence by selling their sovereignty to the organization. That is why the secretary general has an enormous job to do: his mandate will be nothing less than to save the United Nations from itself, prove that it is not impervious to reform, and show that it can be downsized, brought under control, and harnessed to contribute to the security needs of the 21st century. This is a gargantuan, and perhaps impossible, task. But if it cannot be done, then the United Nations is not worth saving. And if it is not done, I, for one, will be leading the charge for U.S. withdrawal.

FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

I remain opposed to the CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention] as transmitted by the president [to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification]. My recommendation would be to focus on top Republican priorities first. These would include:

- Enactment of legislation fundamentally restructuring the antiquated foreign policy agencies of the United States,
- Enactment of legislation that ensures comprehensive reform of the United Nations,
- Submission of ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) and CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) Treaty modifications to the Senate for advice and consent, and
- Enactment of legislation to deploy a national missile defense.

Once we have succeeded in having our top priorities enacted into law, we can turn our attention to the matter of the CWC.

KEY CONDITIONS RELATING TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Following are several key conditions for the resolution of ratification of the CWC.

Russian Elimination of Chemical Weapons and Implementation of the BDA

This condition prohibits the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification until Russia has committed to implement the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA), resolved concerns over its incomplete data declarations under the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding, ratified the Convention, and committed to forgo the clandestine maintenance of a chemical weapons production capability. Such commitments by Russia are integral to the success of the CWC in securing a truly global ban on the possession and use of chemical weapons.

Chemical Weapons in Countries Other than Russia

The Chemical Weapons Convention is not a comprehensive ban. For this treaty to contribute to the national security of the United States, it must — at a minimum — affect those countries possessing chemical weapons which pose a threat to the United States. Accordingly, the United States should not become party to this treaty until those countries of concern have also joined.

High Confidence in Monitoring and Verification of Compliance

This condition prohibits the deposit of the instrument of ratification until the President certifies that the Intelligence community has the capability to “monitor with a high degree of confidence the compliance of all parties to the Convention.” It also requires the President to

certify compliance annually and to submit the equivalent of an annual National Intelligence Estimate on chemical weapons.

U.S. Response to Noncompliance

This condition clarifies what the Senate expects of the President with respect to acts of noncompliance of sufficient gravity to threaten the national security interests of the United States. This provision directs the President to seek a challenge inspection of the noncompliant party, to pursue multilateral sanctions within the Security Council, and, in the event that noncompliance persists, seek a Senate resolution of support for continued U.S. adherence to the Convention.

Primacy of the United States Constitution

This condition states that the United States Constitution supersedes all provisions of the CWC. This must be stated unequivocally since a number of CWC provisions give me cause for concern. In particular, the right of the OPCW [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons] to inspect private U.S. facilities must be reconciled with the Constitutional rights of U.S. citizens to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Nothing in the CWC shall be construed to require or authorize legislation, or any other action, by the United States which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Protection of Confidential Business Information

A loss of confidential business information through a challenge inspection, sample analysis at an OPCW-designated laboratory, or tough unauthorized disclosure by OPCW personnel would prove damaging to many U.S. chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industries. The Senate holds the OPCW liable for money damages under the United States Constitution and U.S. domestic law for any breach of confidentiality or loss of proprietary business information. ●

SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY TO FOSTER PEACE AND SECURITY

An Interview with Senator Paul Sarbanes

The United States must reverse the “consistent decline” in its international affairs budget if it is to exercise a proper leadership role in shaping “a more peaceful and secure world,” Sarbanes says. He sees real danger in the attempts by some members of Congress to hold up needed funding for international institutions — and approval of key appointments and treaties — in an effort to advance their own interests. Sarbanes, a Maryland Democrat, is a senior minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He also is the top-ranking Democrat on the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, and a member of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee. He was interviewed by Contributing Editor Ralph Dannheisser.

QUESTION: Some people have suggested that President Clinton was focused more heavily on domestic issues in his first term and that he'll turn more attention to foreign policy in his second. Do you agree?

SARBANES: Actually, I thought that the Clinton administration had a pretty active foreign policy during its first term. Secretary Christopher and the career foreign service had a number of accomplishments to their credit — Haiti; Bosnia; progress on the Middle East; North Korea and the nuclear weapons issue; a consistent focus on Russia throughout the period. I think this has moved things in the right direction. Of course, the administration made a number of initiatives in the trade area, in the economic area internationally — so I don't think it's altogether accurate to view the first term as not containing a foreign policy focus or foreign policy achievements.

Generally speaking, unless confronted by an international crisis, new presidents have to get their domestic house in order, and Clinton obviously had to give attention to that, including getting the budget in order, getting the fiscal trendlines working in the right direction, which of course he's done. We have the best economy we've had in a quarter of a century. The unemployment rate's at a 20-year low, inflation's at a 30-year low. Now our people go to international conferences and everyone's envious of how the American

economy is working. Our deficit is 1.4 percent of our GDP — the best performance, by a significant margin, of any of the industrialized countries. Now, I expect the president personally may be able to give more of his time to the international arena in his second term. Obviously there are a number of issues outstanding and others will develop; we'll have to see how the next four years proceed.

Q: Did you get any clues to that in the State of the Union address?

SARBANES: The most important thing the president did in the State of the Union was to outline a budget that seeks to reverse the consistent decline in the resources that we're committing to international affairs. You can't be a great nation if you're not prepared to commit the resources to back it up, and you can't exercise world leadership on the cheap. The president's budget recognizes that, and I very much hope the Congress will be supportive of providing the resources that I think our people need to do the job.

We're way behind in meeting our obligations to the international organizations and the multilateral institutions; it's shameful that we should be in such arrears, for example, at the United Nations. The president is trying to come to grips with that, and I hope the Congress will back him up on it. That will be an issue of contention in the Congress, I don't think there's any question about that.

Of course, we're not committing the kind of resources we need to have a first-rate diplomatic corps. I agree with Secretary of State Albright when she said we were unilaterally disarming in a diplomatic sense. Diplomacy is not a relic of some bygone era that can be either conducted on the cheap or dispensed with altogether. It's really our first and most cost-effective line of national defense.

Q: There is some feeling that the partisan clashes between Congress and the president that have seemed to mark the last couple of years may be supplanted by a more bipartisan approach. Do you see that happening?

SARBANES: To be very candid with you, I think it's too early to tell. There's some nice rhetoric, but we don't yet know what the reality will be. I hope that's the case, I hope we'll be able to work together across the party divisions in the Congress in a positive and constructive manner, and I know the president has indicated his own desire to do so. I just hope that these expressions of support will in fact carry over into reality.

Q: I wonder whether some of those early expressions were offset a bit by [Senate Foreign Relations Committee] Chairman [Jesse] Helms, when he listed all the items he intends to deal with before he agrees to consider the Chemical Weapons Treaty.

SARBANES: If we don't ratify the Chemical Weapons Treaty by the end of April, we'll be left out of the process of implementing it and our chemical industry will be placed at a significant disadvantage in the international marketplace. The convention manifestly serves our national interest. Just the other day, I read a very strong article by former [Republican] Secretary of State James Baker endorsing the CWC and urging that it be ratified. So there's very substantial and significant bipartisan support for it, and yet it's being held up here.

There's even talk of linking it to other issues. If the issue weren't so serious, you'd just shake your

head at this kind of tactic. Here's an international treaty that the United States was very instrumental in helping to formulate. It is being ratified at a very rapid pace by other countries and will really give us an opportunity to get at the chemical weapons issue. While we intend, in any event, unilaterally to eliminate our chemical weapons stockpile, we can't move forward on eliminating this entire class of weapons of mass destruction on a multilateral basis. We held extensive hearings on it in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year; we reported it out on a 13-5 vote, a very strong bipartisan vote. The chemical manufacturers strongly support the treaty. And yet, we're having difficulty in moving the treaty forward.

Q: Do you see the linkages that Chairman Helms has set up as boding ill for the whole approach of bipartisanship?

SARBANES: I see those linkages generally as impeding, in a very ill-considered way, our ability to achieve our objectives in foreign policy. We had a situation last year where the assignments of career ambassadors were being held up for reasons completely unrelated to their individual qualifications. The United States therefore was not represented by ambassadors in a number of very critical postings abroad. They were being held hostage, as it were, to other objectives that Senator Helms was trying to achieve. And you can't run a foreign policy that way. Foreign policy is too important to the security interest, the economic interest of the nation to have it dealt with in that cavalier manner.

Q: Is it a concern at this point that that's going to continue to be the situation?

SARBANES: Yes, I think it's a concern. I hope I'm disproven in that concern, but it certainly was manifest last year and it's now being reflected again on this first item on our agenda, the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Q: With the Republicans in control of the Senate and House, and so setting the agenda here, what

do you expect the priorities of the Congress to be in the foreign policy area?

SARBANES: Well, of course the president and the administration have a very large hand in setting the agenda. The president has a certain amount of latitude in the conduct of foreign policy simply by the nature of the powers conferred on him by the Constitution. I think the president has now in effect presented to the Congress an important agenda. There will obviously be further matters as we move through the course of the administration's four-year term, but the most immediate focus will be on the budget and on seeing if we can't get the administration the resources with which to conduct a reasonable foreign policy.

Q: Related to the resource issue, there was an effort last session to combine functions of some of the other foreign affairs agencies into the State Department — the U.S. Information Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Do you see that surfacing again?

SARBANES: Well, I assume it will surface. It is an item that Senator Helms was pushing very hard. Of course, he was pushing combining the functions and also significantly reducing the resources, which was a proposition of doing less with less.

This notion of simply shifting boxes around doesn't really get to the underlying question of how do you carry out your functions and responsibilities, and to some extent we're glossing over those larger questions: Is the United States to have an information service? Are we to have a sustainable development program to help countries around the world come up out of poverty and get themselves on a course so they can meet the needs of their people? Doesn't arms control and disarmament remain a significant issue in the international arena? In fact, I am quite concerned about the continued proliferation of arms, both conventional and weapons of mass destruction, after the Cold War has supposedly ended. There's still an incredible amount of arms proliferation

going on. Regional arms races are taking place, often fueled by the United States on both sides, and that could produce an outbreak of hostilities among recipient countries in the region.

So all these issues are still before us. It would be a sad commentary if history were to look back on this period and say, "You had an opportunity in the last decade of the 20th Century and going into the 21st Century, with the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, to shift the world to a new plateau in terms of peaceful arrangements, and you failed to take advantage of that opportunity." So I'm very concerned about how we are discharging our responsibilities. We ought to be seizing on these opportunities to shape a more peaceful and secure world environment. That's where the focus of our attention ought to be.

Q: That segues into the issue of NATO enlargement, which seems to be an up-front matter. Where is that going to go?

SARBANES: Secretary Albright is trying to deal with that right now. We'll have to see what decision is made at the Madrid conference this summer and how successful the administration and our allies are in working out with the Russians arrangements that provide assurances that this isn't a hostile move against Russia that would provoke a hostile response.

Q: Secretary Albright is talking about the creation of a joint NATO-Russian brigade. What do you think of that?

SARBANES: I imagine we'll look at a number of ideas between now and summer, trying to address this question, and I think there'll be a sorting-out period. I think it's very important that what's done be carefully thought through, because the failure to do that could have large, unintended consequences, and we're dealing in an area with a lot of sensitivities that must be taken into account.

Q: You mentioned the problem of U.S. arrears at the United Nations. Is there likely to be, in the

short term, any resolution of that issue, or is Senator Helms' opposition likely to prevail?

SARBANES: Well, one of the issues will be whether the U.N. has to do all of these reforms first, before it gets any payoff of the overdue assessments. I don't think we ever should have been in the position of being behind on our assessment. I don't think it's any way to show world leadership. In fact, it makes reform harder to achieve rather than easier to achieve. Having said that, we did fall behind and use that as pressure, and to some extent it may have had an impact, but I think the time is long past when we're getting any benefits out of it. It has now severely undercut our influence at the United Nations. And it's not only an issue at the United Nations. There are other multilateral institutions where the United States is in arrears, and other countries now are scoring off that fact.

It also fails to recognize that most of what the U.N. does very much serves America's interest. In fact, all of these peacekeeping operations have to be approved by the Security Council; the United States has a veto in the Security Council, so by definition, the United Nations cannot undertake such an activity if the United States disapproves of it. Presumably if we don't disapprove of it, that's because we perceive that it serves our own interest that that action go forward. And yet we refuse to subscribe the resources to make it possible; we place the institution in an incredibly constricted position. The United States was instrumental in getting a new secretary general; now if the U.S. isn't forthcoming in meeting its obligations, presumably that will have the result of undermining the secretary general that we helped to move into office. It's not logical. It doesn't make sense in terms of serving our national interest.

I'm increasingly concerned that some of these tactics are being used to, in effect, undermine U.S. participation in these institutions indirectly. Opponents are unwilling to take on the direct challenge of asserting that the United States ought not to participate in these international arrangements — again, not just the United

Nations, but others as well — because they understand that there's strong public support for such participation. So they seek to achieve the same objective indirectly by cutting funding so substantially that it really is weakening the basic institutional arrangements.

These institutions, which were put into place at the end of World War II, have a greater chance of success now than they've had in the last 50 years, because in many previous instances they were immobilized in carrying out their functions by the Cold War and the conflict between the two superpowers and their respective camps. That's no longer the case. We have to have a strong foreign policy, but we also have to have a smart foreign policy. I'm becoming more and more concerned about how smart we are in perceiving what serves our national interest.

Q: Do you have any hope that this is going to turn around in the next session of Congress, that your opponents will, in effect, come around and see the light?

SARBANES: I think we have to seek increasingly to demonstrate what's at stake. We have to reject spurious linkages that are simply used as a tactic of extortion, hostage-taking.

Let me go back to the CWC. Let us say here's a Chemical Weapons Convention — this is what it provides, this is why it serves American interests. Now someone comes along and says, "Well, now, you know, maybe I'll let the CWC go through, if you'll do A, B, C, D and E," all of them totally unrelated to the CWC. We ought to just say that's an improper and an impermissible tactic. We can't bargain about the CWC as though we were in the bazaar. Now, if you want to raise issues involving the CWC itself, let's discuss those and take them head-on. This was a convention, after all, on which negotiations began under President Reagan and were carried through by President Bush. President Clinton is completing that agenda.

Opponents say, "Well, the rogue states are not part of the CWC." That's true. The question is, will

the CWC make it easier or more difficult to deal with the rogue states? It will obviously make it easier, because it will place international sanctions on the rogue states and make it harder for them to acquire the components for chemical weapons. We need to recognize that ratification is an effort to protect our interests. Is the United States — the world's leader, as we're constantly reminding ourselves — simply going to absent itself from this highly successful international agreement to eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, something people have been seeking for a long time?

Then you get into nuclear nonproliferation; you have the same kind of arguments that need to be made. The same is true with regard to international cooperation to deal with environmental problems, terrorism, or the drug trade. We have strong interests in all of those

arenas, and we need to get on with the task, in a very shrewd and intelligent way, of advancing our nation's interests, which I think are well served by advancing the goal of a more prosperous and peaceful world.

Q: Are you optimistic at this point that we're going to do some of these things? Are the pieces in place, and is the Congress willing?

SARBANES: I don't think that the question is whether you're optimistic or pessimistic. You have to make the effort to achieve these things, regardless. It's not as though you can look and say, "Well, it's going to be difficult to do, and therefore we won't undertake the effort." There's too much at stake to have that attitude, so we have to mount the effort and we'll see what the outcome is. That's what the struggle will be about in this Congress in the coming months. ●

“STANDING UP FOR WHAT’S RIGHT” IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

An Interview with Representative James Leach

The Clinton administration must “stand up for what’s right” in its dealings with Congress on key international affairs issues, including payment of the U.S. debt to the United Nations and ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, says Leach. If it does, he argues, “it will prevail, and prevail easily.” Leach, an Iowa Republican, is chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services and a senior member of the International Relations Committee. This interview was conducted by Contributing Editor Ralph Dannheisser.

QUESTION: Much has been said about the shift from the confrontational attitude in the 104th Congress to presumably a more cooperative relationship between the Clinton administration and Congress in the 105th. How do you see that affecting legislative efforts, particularly in foreign affairs?

LEACH: I think there’s going to be a more cooperative spirit in foreign affairs absent an emergency. And all emergencies are unique; we could see terrific cooperation in an emergency or the reverse.

The great battle underway that no one has really very well thought through is the role of diplomacy in the post-Cold War era. Both the executive branch and the Congress, in both Republican and Democratic administrations, have allowed high priority items to be frittered away, in terms of the State Department budget itself and the role of embassies and consulates abroad, the role of the Foreign Service as an institution. This administration has fairly decent instincts, but to date has shown very little willingness to risk its political capital on these matters. My view is that the role of diplomacy has to be upgraded, and that good diplomacy brings greater security at a lower cost. Poor diplomacy is likely to lead to higher governmental cost, particularly in the military budget, and to jeopardize security.

In particular I would point to the multilateral area where, in a time of relative peace and prosperity, the most prosperous country on the planet is three years in arrears on its U.N. debt, which I think is a national embarrassment. It has enormous implications for our leadership in the world community. It is much resented in virtually every foreign capital. And it goes beyond the United Nations to involve other important international institutions, spinoff institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The Congress is now taking aim at these institutions, with a view to cutting back.

It’s noteworthy that this administration is not advocating full repayment. The United States, in fact, is advocating 70 percent payment of U.S. back debts to the United Nations, with Congress potentially balking and looking for ways of cutting further. And then, extraordinarily to me, this administration is not even willing to be committed to reengage in the work of UNESCO, which is one of the least dangerous international organizations ever created. The general instincts of the administration are multilateralist, but they’re not fully committed, and it’s going to be very interesting to see how an unfully committed administration works with the Congress on resolving this issue.

Q: Do you see it as a matter of inadequate commitment, or does the administration's approach reflect an unwillingness to overplay its hand vis-a-vis a Congress inclined toward cutting funding far more severely?

LEACH: My argument is that the administration does not fully understand the last two years of executive-legislative budget conditions. Basically speaking, we have not thought through, as a society, the meaning of divided government when the executive is more liberal than the Congress. We have a fair amount of experience with the reverse. President Jerry Ford [a Republican], for example, would veto bills; the [then-Democratic] Congress would re-present them to the president with slightly lower funding levels. In the new Republican-led Congress, the assumption was that we'd send up bills with slightly lower funding levels initially, and that it would look pretty flaccid for the president to veto in order to get more spending.

That was the logic that prevailed until the [December 1995 Federal] government shutdown, with the assumption being that no administration would risk shutting the government down. This administration decided to take that risk — and found that it had the support of the public. Congress, it turned out, cannot realistically stand up to the administration when a government shutdown is implicit. Indeed, the administration can prevail on anything, within the realm of reason, to which it elects to give a very high priority. Now if it exceeds the realm of reason and steps into huge budget increases in unchartered ways, Congress might prevail.

With regard to the United Nations, in my view, it's very simple. If the administration makes it a cause celebre, it will prevail, and prevail easily. If it views it as one of these negotiating circumstances, it will be cut up by Congress and it will end up in a no-win circumstance, provoking the irritation of foreign countries as well as the Congress. Therefore, my view is simply to do the right thing, which is to acknowledge that the United States has a vested interest in the stability of the United

Nations and a vested interest in international diplomacy. Certainly the United Nations is not a critical institution at all times — but it matters profoundly when it is critical. It should be instructive to this Congress that at the time in this decade that it did most matter, the president of the United States had more support from the United Nations Security Council in the Gulf War than he did from the United States Senate. If we continue down the road of irresponsible, ideological games-playing with international institutions, we're going to find, when times get tough, that our reservoir of good will is largely eroded.

Q: Do you see the main opposition to the full payment of our U.N. debt as coming from the Senate, specifically from Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms?

LEACH: No, full funding opposition is large in the House too, although I think the House will be sympathetic to partial funding. I don't relate it to any individual. I relate it to whether or not this country is going to stand up for what's right in foreign affairs and also whether we recognize that the United Nations is far more popular than unpopular. We're letting a very small number of Americans create a very irrational rallying cry that is counterproductive. Diplomacy enhances security and makes sovereignty more possible. Some would suggest that any international arrangement jeopardizes sovereignty, when it's actually the reverse.

Q: Beyond funding matters, what initiatives in the international relations area do you view as critical for the new Congress to deal with?

LEACH: One of the principal areas is arms control. You have a Chemical Weapons Convention that was placed on the table by Ronald Reagan, negotiated by George Bush, and sent to the Senate by Bill Clinton. For the United States Senate not to endorse this treaty jeopardizes our security and our capacity to deal realistically in diplomacy in all other fora. When the United States leads, and then rejects what we've led in producing, it is destructive to international relations and brings

great discredit on our institutions of governance. This is a highly symbolic issue, as is the test ban, as is the potential of developing new arms controls — whether it be follow-ons to START [Strategic Arms Reduction] treaties, whether it be areas such as landmines.

Q: If I hear you correctly, you're saying that if the administration proceeds forcefully, it can enlist the necessary public support on these issues?

LEACH: They will have broad public support. It will be very difficult for the Congress to reject, because suddenly Congress is saying it does not want to pay — if you take the United Nations — its treaty-obligated dues, which is a position I certainly don't think the Congress would want to be in. In arms control it would say that the Senate majority would reject a treaty negotiated by past presidents from their own party. The problem is that the executive branch isn't perceived to be strong, and it means that, in the eyes of some, anything it advocates somehow has missing ingredients. I happen to think that any American president is generally far more than half right more than half the time. Institutionally, particularly in foreign policy, we have surprising continuity and the American national interest is, generally speaking, fairly consistent. Congress has got to stop playing political games and look at the national interest. I'm optimistic on that. I've written the secretary of state a very strong letter, talked to various parties at the State Department and in the White House on standing up for what's right, and I am not impressed when they stand up for what's three-quarters right.

Q: I know you have a particular background and interest in U.S.-Asian relations. What impact do you think the recent death of Deng Xiaoping will have on relations with China, particularly where Congress is concerned?

LEACH: You have to be very careful on premature judgments. My favorite comment on China came when Chou Enlai gave an interview to a French journalist. As kind of an aside he was asked what he thought the meaning of the French Revolution

was, to which he responded it was too early to tell. But clearly, Deng stands for an opening to the West, stands for market economy. Those are precepts that, if they're sustained in China, will give him a remarkable place in China's history. The Chinese understand their investment interest pretty well, opening to the outside as well as the market economy. China will be pretty stable, in terms of internal politics.

I look for Asia not to be as perfectly democratic as we might wish, and China to proceed slower than other parts. But I am optimistic on the issue of trade. Free trade will, in the long run, impel freer societies. The one political freedom that appeared to spring up under Deng Xiaoping is a far greater freedom of expression, at a personal level, than had been the rule for generations. They can dissent to their friends, their family — as long as they don't do anything about that dissent vis-a-vis the government. You no longer go to jail for griping, but you will go to jail if you try to do something about the object of your griping.

Q: From our perspective, do you think there should or will be a linkage between human rights and continued trade expansion?

LEACH: I think we have an obligation to stick by our own national values — to reflect our dissent to China on their human rights situation. For example, here is one of the very few places where the pro-life and pro-choice communities in America are unanimous — the forced tying of tubes, particularly in areas such as Tibet. It's just unsanctionable. Having said that, we've got to be very careful not to take counterproductive actions. We, as a society, sometimes try to use every instrument at our disposal to deal with a circumstance that we might not like. As a general proposition, I don't think trade is a very good vehicle to use for this kind of dissent.

Now there are always exceptions, and I don't think anyone should ever have hard and fast rules. I thought the embargo this country put on South Africa was both morally desirable and effective. But it's not at all clear to me that embargoes on

trade with China would be anything but counterproductive to the causes we might advocate. Having an isolated China, a more paranoid China, could have serious implications for foreign policy.

Q: Putting aside the issues of obvious conflict between the administration and Congress, do you see areas where there is likely to be pretty ready agreement in the coming session?

LEACH: Well, I don't think there's going to be a great battle on foreign aid this year, and support for Israel is absolutely bipartisan and firm.

You have an interesting discussion, where Congress is leading the executive branch a bit, on the issue of NATO expansion. I think you will see not only a supportive Congress if a decision is made in that

direction but a precipitant Congress. In the last election, commentary in Congress pushed the administration to shift gears a little more toward the Republican position of support for expanding NATO to include the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary at this time.

Q: There the question appears to be getting Russia to accept such a development.

LEACH: Well, it's a very awkward thing for Russia. I think it's really crucial that we describe and define NATO expansion as being intended to deal with the problems defensively and within a European context rather than offensively and in an encircling manner. There is no desire to be aggressive toward Russia. The basic goal is stabilizing the societies of Eastern Europe. ●

CLINTON, CONGRESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY: AN OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVE

*By Morton H. Halperin
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations*

Two issues — the Chemical Weapons Convention and the effort to secure increased funding for international affairs — will do much to shape the relationship between the Executive Branch and the Congress on foreign policy in President Clinton's second term, Halperin says.

How these issues are dealt with "will tell much about whether the revamped administration foreign policy team is prepared...to work with the Congress to reach the necessary compromises," he notes.

Halperin, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, served from 1994-96 as a special assistant to the president and senior director for democracy at the National Security Council. He also has been a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and director of the Washington Office of the American Civil Liberties Union, and served from 1966-69 as deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

He has authored, co-authored and edited more than a dozen books including "Self-Determination in the New World Order" and "Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy."

The Clinton administration's substantive foreign policy agenda with the Congress already is well defined. There is so much the president already wants that it is doubtful that he can or should add anything more. The real question is whether President Clinton and the reconstituted national security team are ready to make the changes in their approach to the Congress that will be necessary in order to gain the support the president needs.

Two issues which need to be dealt with early on will do much to shape the relationship between the president and the Congress on foreign policy in his second term. These are ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the effort to secure increased funding for the 150 account, which governs spending on international affairs. A look at these two issues and what must be done to resolve them illuminates the basic issues the Clinton administration faces in dealing with the Republican-controlled Congress as both branches seek to establish the rules for dealing with the post-Cold War environment.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

It is a measure of how greatly views in the Republican-controlled Senate have changed, that an arms control treaty negotiated by Republican administrations with the full support of the military can be in grave difficulty. If the Senate does not consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention by April 29, the United States will not be a founding member of the treaty regime that comes into force on that date. Thus, the administration has made it clear that this is its highest short-run priority. The new secretary of state, Madeline Albright, has spoken out strongly in favor of the treaty, and the new national security adviser, Sandy Berger, is leading the negotiating effort with Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott.

With Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms on record as opposing ratification, Lott is the administration's only hope for obtaining the two-thirds vote required for Senate approval. He must be willing to force the convention out of the Foreign Relations

Committee, where Helms has threatened to bottle it up, and to schedule it for floor debate and a final vote for passage — even if he is not willing to vote for it himself.

Becoming the leader of your party in the Senate, like the threat of hanging, sobers the mind and forces the senator to think about national concerns and his role in history as well as his own ideology and the need not to get too far out in front of his troops. Thus, like his predecessor, Everett Dirksen — the Senate GOP minority leader who moved from skeptic to supporter of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in the early 1960s — Lott is clearly looking for a way to be helpful without losing his own base of support.

The majority leader clearly spelled out, in a January 8 letter to the president, what he wants and needs. The letter begins by expressing a willingness to work out the Chemical Weapons Convention issues, but it warns the president that actions of his administration on other arms control issues — particularly the “unwillingness to seriously consider our views on the appropriate constitutional role of the Senate in providing advice and consent on treaties” — jeopardize any prospect for cooperation.

“I would point to three important issues,” the letter says: “demarcation limits to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 (ABM Treaty); multilateralization of the ABM Treaty; and flank limits to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty of 1990 (CFE Treaty). In each of these cases, your administration has negotiated substantive modifications of the treaties, and then taken questionable legal positions that render Senate advice and consent an option that can be ignored rather than a constitutional obligation that must be fulfilled.”

Lott’s letter goes on to detail the disagreement on these issues and to point to legislation enacted by the Congress that states that the Senate must be consulted on what it considers to be changes in the substance of treaties to which it gave its consent to ratification.

The majority leader notes in the letter that he has pledged to work together with the administration on foreign policy issues, but he points out that bipartisanship must be a two-way street. He asks for cooperation on the issues he cites and offers it on the Chemical Weapons Convention, warning that he will not move on the convention until these issues are resolved.

The substance of Lott’s position aside, two points are worth noting. First, the debate between the Senate and the administration over what changes in treaties require Senate concurrence is not a new one — the political parties have just changed sides. In the 1980s Senate Democrats led by Senator Sam Nunn, with support from staffers some of whom now play key roles in the executive branch, fought against efforts by the Reagan administration to reinterpret the ABM treaty without the consent of the Senate. The position was correct then as it is now. Second, as Senator Lott notes, ratification of treaties requires bipartisan cooperation and that in turn requires listening to what responsible Senate leaders say is necessary for them to be able to cooperate.

Without yielding on the substance of these issues, the administration must concede a role to the Senate if it is to get ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and lay the groundwork for cooperation, especially on a number of arms control treaties that would follow ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including a treaty to ban all nuclear testing.

FINANCING THE 150 ACCOUNT

Secretary of State Albright, in all of her public statements, has pointed to the need to provide the financing that is necessary for American global leadership and has warned that additional cuts in the 150 account — which pays for everything from embassies and consulates, to international broadcasting, development assistance, programs to combat terrorism, and this electronic journal — jeopardize the ability of the United States to promote peace, prosperity, and support for democracy around the world. With active support

from Sandy Berger, she has persuaded the president to ask the Congress for increased spending for these purposes, including the money to pay the arrears that the United States owes to the United Nations.

The administration understands that funding requires the cooperation of the Congress. In contrast to treaties, however, the president needs only the support of a majority in each House, and he can trade off his support for these expenditures by compromising on GOP budget objectives on defense and some domestic issues. Nonetheless, here as well, the administration will need to listen to and accommodate the concerns of Congress regarding the level of funding for international affairs and the payment of United Nations dues.

As was noted in a recently released statement by a Brookings Institution/Council on Foreign Relations Task Force calling for an increase in spending for the 150 account, Congress will insist on some accommodation on the issue of consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies if it is to give a sympathetic hearing to the request for more funds.

In the last Congress, when Senator Helms and Congressman Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, proposed merging the independent foreign affairs agencies (the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) into the State Department, the administration not only rejected the proposal on its merits, but it also asserted that executive branch reorganization was solely the responsibility of the president. Democrats in the Congress rallied around the president and the result was the first partisan split on the State Department Authorization Bill with the consequence that no bill passed in the last Congress.

If the administration takes the same approach again, it stands no chance of getting the level of funding that it seeks and needs. One solution with support in the Congress and among some

non-governmental groups is to have the president and the Congress appoint a nonpartisan commission to examine the most effective way to integrate the current work of these agencies with the State Department in the post-Cold War period. Administration acceptance of such a proposal would probably be sufficient to take this issue off the table until the commission reports a year later.

Working out this solution will require the administration to sit down for serious discussions with Senator Helms as well as with his Republican colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, many of whom will be more supportive of the effort to increase funding for foreign affairs than is the chairman. Administration leaders also will need to meet with Chairman Gilman and his colleagues on the House International Affairs Committee who also will be more sympathetic. It goes without saying that key Democrats on the two committees, including long-standing House Democratic leader Lee Hamilton and the new Democratic leader on the Senate committee, Joe Biden, also will need to be part of the process.

Bipartisan and bicameral cooperation also will be needed if the administration is to succeed in its effort to secure the funds to pay American arrears to the United Nations. There are two issues here that need sorting out. First is the question of whether, as Senator Helms fears, the administration will try to do without an authorization from his committee. Nothing would more quickly doom this effort, and the administration seems to understand that. Second is the need to secure agreement between branches and parties on the conditions to be attached to the payment of arrears.

There is much reason to be skeptical of the willingness of Senator Helms to reach a reasonable accommodation, but after it tries and fails at that effort, the administration needs to reach out to other Republicans on the Senate committee and to Chairman Gilman to reach an agreement that can command majority support in the committees and on the floors of both houses.

How these two issues are dealt with will tell much about whether the revamped administration foreign policy team is prepared to accept the realities of divided government and the constitutional separation of powers and to work with the Congress to reach the necessary compromises. Success in these efforts will pave the way for needed cooperation on other issues —

ballistic missile defense, deployments to Bosnia, defense budget spending, other arms control agreements — which will come before the Congress in this session. Failure would be a very bad omen for the bipartisan and bicameral cooperation that is a prerequisite for a successful American foreign policy. ●

(The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government.)

PROFILES: TOP ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY OFFICIALS

Following are brief profiles of top administration officials who deal with foreign policy issues.

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT **Secretary of State**

Madeleine Albright, the first woman to be U.S. secretary of state, has been a key member of President Clinton's foreign policy team since becoming the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations in January 1993.

In the past four years, Albright — a naturalized American citizen who was born in Czechoslovakia — also has served as a member of the president's Cabinet and has traveled the world promoting the administration's foreign policy.

The United States, she declared at her swearing-in ceremony in January 1997, "must formulate and finance a world-class diplomacy to complement our world-class military." The administration, she said, "must explain" its foreign policy policies and priorities to the American people "with a logic they can embrace and a reasoning they can relate to their own lives."

Before her nomination as U.N. ambassador, Albright was president of the Center for National Policy, a non-profit research organization formed in 1981 by representatives from government, industry, labor, and education. The center's mandate is to promote the study and discussion of domestic and international issues.

As a research professor of international affairs and director of Women in Foreign Service Programs at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, she taught undergraduate and graduate courses in international affairs, U.S. foreign policy, Russian foreign policy, and Central and Eastern European politics.

From 1981 to 1982, Albright was awarded a fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian Institution. She also served as a senior fellow in Soviet and Eastern European affairs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, conducting research in developments and trends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

From 1978-1981, Albright was a staff member on the National Security Council, as well as a White House staff member, where she was responsible for foreign policy legislation. From 1976 to 1978, she served as chief legislative assistant to Senator Edmund S. Muskie.

Awarded a B.A. degree from Wellesley College with honors in political science, Albright studied at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, received a certificate from the Russian Institute at Columbia University, and her masters and doctorate degrees from Columbia University's Department of Public Law and Government. Albright has three daughters.

WILLIAM COHEN **Secretary of Defense**

After 24 years in the U.S. Congress, William Cohen had been looking forward to becoming a private citizen when President Clinton called him back to public service to be secretary of defense.

Cohen, who retired in 1996 after representing the state of Maine for three terms in the Senate and three in the House of Representatives, is the first Republican member of the president's Cabinet. His unanimous confirmation by the Senate was "a

strong signal of its intention to work in a constructive bipartisan spirit to preserve and enhance our national security,” Clinton said at Cohen’s swearing-in ceremonies.

Described as moderate to conservative on defense and foreign policy issues, Cohen, who was a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has supported a strong naval force and helped forge a bipartisan compromise on anti-ballistic missile policy.

Protecting and promoting U.S. global interests, he says, requires “wise policies and the military strength to back up those policies.” The U.S. cannot be the world’s policeman, nor can it “ever afford to become a prisoner of world events,” he declared immediately after his swearing-in.

Cohen was an influential voice in Congress on international security issues. His efforts led to the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which later developed into the U.S. Central Command, and the maritime repositioning program, both of which were key to the success of the Gulf War.

As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence — and its vice chairman from 1987-91, Cohen co-authored the Intelligence Oversight Reform Act of 1991, as well as legislation designed to overhaul U.S. counterintelligence efforts and defend against foreign political and industrial espionage.

A graduate of Boston University Law School, Cohen served on the board of directors of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1989 to 1997 and chaired the council’s Middle East Study Group in 1996. He has also chaired and served on numerous study groups and committees at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the School of Advanced International Studies, and the Brookings Institution on issues ranging from Defense Department reorganization to NATO enlargement and chemical weapons arms control.

Since 1985, Cohen has led the American delegation of senior executive branch officials and members of Congress to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, which brings together senior officials from NATO and Partnership for Peace countries. He also led American delegations to the American-Arab Dialogue in Cairo and the Pacific Dialogue in Kuala Lumpur, which are regional conferences on security and economic issues.

Cohen’s wife, Janet Langhart, is president of Langhart Communications. They have two grown sons.

SAMUEL L. BERGER
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Samuel L. Berger — who was named by President Clinton in December to be assistant to the president for national security affairs, the top position on the National Security Council (NSC) — served in Clinton’s first term as deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs.

Clinton chose Berger to replace former NSC adviser Anthony Lake when Lake was nominated to be director of central intelligence. In announcing the appointment, Clinton noted that Berger had “helped to pull together our foreign policy team” and has “given it direction, guidance and shared purpose.”

“The president made it clear,” Berger later told reporters, that he wants to build on the foundation that was laid in the first term, that he foresees an active foreign-policy agenda, both for our country and for himself.”

A lawyer with a specialty in international trade and administrative law, Berger served as senior foreign policy adviser to then-Governor Clinton during the 1992 presidential campaign. After Clinton won that election, Berger became assistant transition director for national security affairs during the transition from the Bush to the Clinton administrations.

Berger has varied experience in government, having served as special assistant to former New York City Mayor John Lindsay; legislative assistant for former U.S. Senator Harold Hughes (Iowa) and Congressman Joseph Resnick (New York); and deputy director of the policy planning staff at the State Department from 1977-1980 under Lake. During his tenure at the State Department, Berger dealt with a wide variety of international economic, security, and foreign policy matters.

Prior to his service in the Clinton administration, Berger practiced law with the Washington law firm of Hogan & Hartson (1973-1977, 1981-1992), where he was a partner and director of the firm's international trade group. He received his B.A. degree from Cornell University in 1967 and his J.D. degree from Harvard Law School in 1971. He is married to Susan Harrison Berger and they have three children.

ANTHONY LAKE

Director of Central Intelligence-designate

Anthony "Tony" Lake, President Clinton's nominee to be director of central intelligence, has served since January 1993 as assistant to the president for national security affairs, the top position on the National Security Council. Senate confirmation hearings on Lake's nomination were scheduled for March 11.

In announcing the nomination, Clinton said that during the past four years Lake has brought "the power of his mind, the toughness of his character, the strength of his integrity to bear on the most difficult challenges we face....I can think of no more powerful proof of my commitment to...maintaining a strong, successful intelligence community than asking Tony Lake to take the helm as director of central intelligence, and a member of my Cabinet."

Lake, in his remarks, said he believes the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) "is more important than ever" in the post-Cold War era — in defending against "the threats of terrorism and

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; in explaining clearly the activities of governments in an ever more complicated world; and in giving the president the unvarnished facts" to enable him to make "wise decisions in a time of change and promise."

Lake, who was also a senior foreign policy adviser to the first Clinton/Gore presidential election campaign, began his career as a foreign service officer in 1962 and was assigned to Vietnam. He later resigned from then-National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger's staff after President Nixon decided to bomb North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. Returning to government service in 1977, he served during the Carter administration as the State Department's director of policy planning. From 1981 to 1992, Lake was a professor of international relations at Amherst College and then at Mount Holyoke College, both in Massachusetts.

He is the author of several books, including "Somoza Falling," in which the overthrow of former Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza serves as a case study on the making of U.S. foreign policy, and a co-author of "Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy."

Lake is married and has three children.

BILL RICHARDSON

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

President Clinton's choice to be the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations is internationally known as a skilled negotiator who has obtained the release of numerous Americans and others from captivity in countries around the world.

Bill Richardson, a prominent Hispanic-American and 14-year member of Congress, told journalists the day he presented his credentials to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan that "there is a new era in the relationship between the United States

and the United Nations” and “I want to symbolize that....I want to be a bridge to Asia and Africa and Latin America as the U.N. ambassador here.”

Richardson served in the House of Representatives from 1982 to 1996. As chief deputy whip, one of the highest-ranking posts in the House Democratic leadership, he was the author of numerous bills and amendments on foreign policy and defense, the environment, energy, health, and Native Americans. He served as ranking Democratic member of the Resources Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Lands. In addition, he served on the Commerce Committee, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. He was one of the leading advocates in Congress of expanded trade in the Americas and was an ardent booster of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). He also played a leading role in support of clean air and clean water legislation and laws dealing with oil spills.

Richardson has served as a special envoy for President Clinton on sensitive diplomatic missions. In 1995 he met with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, negotiating the release of two imprisoned Americans. In 1994 Richardson’s efforts won the release of two U.S. pilots held by North Korea.

On diplomatic missions to the Caribbean, Richardson met twice in 1996 with Cuban President Fidel Castro and negotiated the release of three prisoners. He has also chaired U.S. observer teams to elections in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and East Germany.

He was nominated for the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize and received the Aztec Eagle Award from the Mexican government — the highest honor bestowed on a foreigner.

The son of a U.S. banker father and a Mexican mother, Richardson grew up in Mexico City and received an M.A. degree from Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He lives in Santa Fe, New Mexico with his wife, Barbara.

JOSEPH DUFFEY

Director, United States Information Agency

As director of the United States Information Agency (USIA) Joseph Duffey has the job of adjusting American public diplomacy to the challenges of the 21st century. In nominating Duffey to the post in April 1993, President Clinton stated: “Joe Duffey’s expertise in the field of education, communications and foreign affairs is vast and will serve him well as he takes the helm at USIA and works to promote the ideals of democracy and freedom abroad.”

Even before completing his graduate studies, Duffey mixed an interest in academics with an active public life. In the 1960s, he participated in the civil rights and anti-war movements, at the same time receiving his masters and doctorate degrees.

While completing his dissertation, he served as co-chairman for Eugene McCarthy’s unsuccessful bid for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1968. Two years later he ran unsuccessfully as the Democratic Party candidate for the U.S. Senate from Connecticut. A young Yale University law student named Bill Clinton worked on his campaign.

Having lectured at a number of major universities and written extensively on sociological and public issues, Duffey was named assistant secretary of state for educational and cultural affairs by President Jimmy Carter in 1977. The following year, he was appointed the chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), a post he held until the second year of the Reagan administration. At the NEH, he managed a complex national program of grants in support of museums, research, public television, and libraries. During that time, he also served as a delegate to the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in 1978 and 1980. In 1991, Duffey was joint head of the U.S. delegation observing national elections in Ethiopia.

In 1982, Duffey returned to academic life, becoming the chancellor of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He subsequently assumed responsibility for the entire University of Massachusetts system. Duffey was named president of The American University in 1991, a position he held until becoming USIA's 13th director.

Duffey has been awarded 14 honorary degrees from U.S. colleges and universities and in 1993 was awarded the honorary Doctor of Letter by Ritsemaken University in Japan. In 1980, he was named Commander of the Order of the Crown by the king of Belgium. He has been a member of the Council on Foreign Relations since 1979.

Duffey is married to Anne Wexler and has four sons.

CHARLENE BARSHEFSKY
U.S. Trade Representative-designate

When President Clinton nominated Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky to be United States trade representative (USTR) in December 1996, she already had been acting in the position for several months following the departure of former USTR Mickey Kantor.

At her nomination hearing in January, Republican Senator Orrin G. Hatch said that "In all the time I've been here, I cannot recall a USTR nominee who has enjoyed such widespread, diverse, bipartisan, and public support for this position." The Senate Finance Committee unanimously approved her nomination in January; the full Senate had not acted on it as of March 4.

Before she was named acting U.S. trade representative, Barshefsky had served for three years as principal deputy U.S. trade representative, with the title of ambassador, playing a pivotal role in developing and pursuing the administration's trade policy objectives. She has been instrumental in achieving multiple trade agreements and investment treaties. Her responsibilities included a

wide range of regional areas, including the Asia Pacific region and Latin America, and functional areas such as intellectual property and investment worldwide.

Before joining the federal government, Barshefsky was a partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm of Steptoe and Johnson. She specialized in international trade law and policy for 18 years and co-chaired the firm's International Practice Group.

In her tenure both at the Office of the United States Trade Representative and at Steptoe and Johnson, Barshefsky has published, lectured, and testified extensively on U.S. and international trade policy and laws.

Barshefsky's professional affiliations and activities are numerous, including service as vice chair of the international law section of the American Bar Association, as well as a member of its governing council.

She graduated in 1972 from the University of Wisconsin and, in 1975, from the Columbus School of Law at Catholic University in Washington, D.C.

She is married to Edward B. Cohen. They reside in Washington, D.C., with their two daughters.

ROBERT E. RUBIN
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury

Robert E. Rubin was sworn in as the 70th secretary of the treasury on January 10, 1995 — during President Clinton's first administration — following a unanimous Senate vote to confirm him. He will retain that post during the president's second term in office.

Clinton said in December that he is pleased Rubin will stay on, noting that "the Treasury Department has never been in better hands."

Before becoming treasury secretary, Rubin served for two years in the White House as assistant to

the president for economic policy. In that capacity he directed the activities of the National Economic Council, a White House group set up by President Clinton to oversee the administration's domestic and international economic policymaking process.

Prior to joining the Clinton administration, Rubin spent 26 years at Goldman, Sachs & Company, an investment banking firm, in New York City. He joined the firm in 1966 as an associate, became a general partner in 1971 and joined the management committee in 1980. Rubin was vice chairman and co-chief operating officer from 1987 to 1990 and served as co-senior partner and co-chairman from 1990 to 1992.

Before joining Goldman, he was an attorney for two years at the firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton in New York City.

Rubin graduated summa cum laude from Harvard College in 1960 with an A.B. degree in economics. He received an LL.B degree from Yale Law School in 1964 and attended the London School of Economics.

Rubin was born in New York City on August 29, 1938. He is married to Judith Oxenberg. They have two adult sons.

WILLIAM M. DALEY
U.S. Secretary of Commerce

The son of legendary Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley and brother of the current mayor, Richard Daley, William M. Daley is a lawyer and businessman. He worked in the Clinton administration briefly once before, when he served as special counsel to the president for the North American Free Trade Agreement from September to November 1993.

More recently he served as co-chair of Chicago '96, the non-partisan host committee charged with overseeing city and community planning for the 1996 Democratic National Convention.

Daley was a partner in the Chicago law firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt from 1985 to 1990 and rejoined that firm in 1993, specializing in the areas of corporate and government relations. He assisted in expanding the firm's Washington office.

He was president and chief operating officer of Amalgamated Bank of Chicago from 1990 to 1993, having joined the bank as vice chairman in 1989. From 1975 to 1985, he was with the law firm Daley & George, Chicago.

Daley is a member of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Economic Club of Chicago. Appointed by President Carter to the Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity in 1977, he served on the council until 1980. He served as chairman of the 1992 Illinois Clinton/Gore campaign.

In his confirmation hearing before the Senate Commerce Committee, Daley urged continuing governmental efforts to help U.S. business open new markets and to insure that trading partners live up to agreements on fair and open trade.

"Our competitors do not let their businesses go it alone in the world and neither should we," Daley said. "At the same time, we shouldn't leave our workers at risk from unfair trade practices. Inscribed over a Commerce Building door is Benjamin Franklin's counsel that 'commerce among nations should be fair and equitable.' That is a standard I will adhere to."

Daley holds a B.A. degree from Loyola University and an LL.B degree from John Marshall Law School, both in Chicago. He and his wife, Loretta, have three children. ●

PROFILES: KEY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS DEALING WITH FOREIGN POLICY

Following are brief profiles of the leaders and ranking minority members of key congressional committees that deal with foreign policy issues. The Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations committees oversee the nation's foreign policy and authorize the international affairs budget. The appropriations committees then appropriate money within parameters set by the authorizing committees.

SENATOR JESSE HELMS
(Republican, North Carolina)
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

A staunch conservative, Jesse Helms has been perhaps the Clinton administration's chief antagonist in Congress on a range of foreign policy issues.

When he endorsed Madeleine Albright for secretary of state at a committee hearing on her nomination, he took pains to let it be known that this reflected respect for her qualities, not agreement with her positions. "My support for this nominee should in no way be misconstrued as an endorsement of President Clinton's conduct of foreign policy. Many Americans, I among them, hope that in the area of foreign policy, the next four years will not produce a sequel to the travail of the first four years" of Clinton's presidency, he declared.

Helms went on to reiterate his disagreement with the president on virtually every front: the invasion of Haiti, U.S. policy in Bosnia, "vacillation" in dealing with China that has let down Taiwan, an "uncertain policy" in Somalia, what he deemed a weak posture with respect to Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Helms has consistently demanded "serious and lasting" reform at the United Nations and has stood firm against paying the huge arrears the United States owes to the international organization until satisfactory reform is achieved.

As chairman in the previous session of Congress, Helms launched an effort — deflected by the

administration — to kill the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and to move their residual functions into the State Department. He promises a renewed effort this year "to restructure our foreign affairs institutions to meet the new challenges we will face in the next century."

Helms, 75, was re-elected to his fifth six-year Senate term last November. Prior to his Senate service, he had been city editor of the Raleigh Times newspaper in North Carolina, administrative assistant to two U.S. senators, and executive vice president of both a Raleigh television station and the Tobacco Radio Network, writing and delivering editorial commentary.

SENATOR JOSEPH BIDEN
(Democrat, Delaware)
Ranking Minority Member
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

At the age of just 54, Joseph Biden ranks seventh in seniority (length of service) among the 100 members of the United States Senate. He was only 29 when he was elected to his first six-year term in 1972, but turned 30 — the legally required age for Senate service — before assuming office. He had briefly practiced law before entering elective politics.

Biden made a brief, unsuccessful run for his party's 1988 presidential nomination won by Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, who in turn lost the general election to Republican President George Bush.

Reelected to his fifth Senate term this past November, Biden chose to move to the first-ranking Democratic seat on the Foreign Relations Committee after 16 years as top Democrat on the Judiciary Committee, including eight as chairman. The top spot on Foreign Relations became available upon the retirement of Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, long the ranking Democratic member.

Announcing his decision in a press release December 3, Biden cited some of the key challenges he sees ahead as the turn of the century approaches: “How can we best adapt to meet America’s changing security threats? How will we deal with China, an emerging economic giant and global power? How can we help Russia to preserve its young democracy and free-market economy? Can we assist Israel to conclude a lasting settlement with its Arab neighbors?”

The Senate, Biden continued, “will play an important role in shaping policy answers to these and many other international questions by ratifying or rejecting treaties, confirming or turning down ambassadorial nominations, authorizing and appropriating the funds to maintain our foreign policy apparatus and our military forces, and expressing its views on a variety of foreign policy topics.”

REPRESENTATIVE BENJAMIN GILMAN
(Republican, New York)
Chairman, House International Relations Committee

Gilman and his Senate counterpart, Jesse Helms, are both Republicans — but from there on the political resemblance becomes less apparent. While Helms is a favorite of conservatives, Gilman has tended to occupy the other end of the party spectrum. Indeed, he voted in opposition to the majority of his party colleagues 55 percent of the time in 1994 — more than any other Republican. And while Helms has been a lightning rod for controversy, Gilman tends to maintain a rather low profile.

A congressman since 1972, Gilman had risen to the senior minority spot on Foreign Affairs — now International Relations — by the time the Republicans assumed control in the 104th Congress.

He long supported the rights of religious believers in the former Soviet Union, and he co-sponsored an amendment to the foreign aid bill to end the arms embargo against Bosnia. Gilman has been a consistent supporter of Israel, an opponent of many arms deals with the Arab nations, and he strongly favored the Gulf War. In recent years he has pushed for coordinated anti-drug efforts among the United States, the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

The veteran congressman signalled his broad disagreement with Clinton administration positions shortly after the Republican victories in 1994 put him in line to be committee chairman. “Instead of a strong, steady signal on foreign policy coming from Washington,” he said, “regrettably the world has heard a series of wavering notes sounded by an uncertain trumpet, leaving our allies concerned and our adversaries confused.” He pledged he would work to make sure that “Congress will be fully and openly consulted about future involvements of any U.S. military intervention overseas.”

Gilman joined with Helms in the last Congress in pushing legislation to fold three foreign affairs agencies — the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency — into a streamlined State Department. Efforts toward this end are expected to continue this year.

REPRESENTATIVE LEE HAMILTON
(Democrat, Indiana)
Ranking Minority Member, House International Relations Committee

Hamilton was widely respected by Democrats and Republicans alike when he served for two years prior to the Republican takeover in the 1994

elections as chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, now renamed International Relations.

A lawyer by training, he has served in the House continuously since he was first elected in the Democratic landslide of 1964; he has announced that he will not seek reelection in 1998.

He served as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee from 1985 to 1987, and chairman of the special committee that conducted the so-called “Iran-Contra” hearings in 1987 and 1988 — a position that brought him national attention. Indeed, both Michael Dukakis in 1988 and Bill Clinton in 1992 reportedly considered him as a possible vice presidential running mate.

As a leading member of the International Relations panel, Hamilton has placed heavy emphasis on efforts to prevent weapons proliferation, putting a somewhat lower priority on promotion of democracy, free markets, and human rights. With respect to China, in particular, he supported both the Bush and Clinton administrations in supporting continued trade ties, and in 1994 he called for eliminating the linkage between Most Favored Nation trade status and human rights.

In an interview conducted last year, Hamilton sounded discouraged about what he saw as inadequate funding for foreign affairs activities and a lack of accomplishments in the area since the Republicans assumed control of Congress.

“I really don’t see any significant foreign policy achievements in the Congress recently,” he told “U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda.” Democrats, he said, have been busy “trying to head off a lot of things that we thought were destructive and that placed barriers in the way of American foreign policy.” He added that Republican efforts to cut back resources that go into international relations have “made the conduct of American foreign policy more difficult.”

SENATOR TED STEVENS

(Republican, Alaska)

Chairman, Senate Appropriations Committee

A member of the Senate since December 1968, Ted Stevens now ranks sixth in seniority in the body, and second only to Strom Thurmond among the majority Republicans.

Stevens was born in Indianapolis, Indiana, but became an Alaskan in the early 1950s. A graduate of the University of California and Harvard Law School, he was U.S. attorney in Fairbanks, Alaska, then served as an official of the U.S. Interior Department in Washington, D.C., for about five years before returning to Anchorage in 1961 to open a private law practice there. He was elected to the Alaska House of Representatives and had served two terms when Alaska’s governor appointed him to a vacant U.S. Senate seat.

Stevens served as the Senate’s assistant Republican leader from 1977 to 1985, but lost a close election to Senator Robert Dole when he sought to move up to the leader’s spot.

He was chairman of the Senate Rules Committee in the last session of Congress, then opted to move to the chairmanship of the powerful Appropriations Committee this year when former chairman, Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon, retired. While heading the Rules Committee, Stevens also chaired the Commerce Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries and the Government Affairs Subcommittee on Post Office and Civil Service. In addition, he has served as co-chairman of the Senate Observers Group to the Arms Control Talks.

While Stevens certainly devotes himself to issues of national consequence, he is perhaps as alert as anyone in the Senate to the parochial interests of his own constituents — so distant from Washington and separated from the “lower 48” states as they are. “We ask for special consideration,” he has said, “because no one else is that far away, no one else has the problems that we have or the potential that we have, and no one else

deals with the federal government day in and day out the way we do.”

SENATOR ROBERT BYRD
(Democrat, West Virginia)
Ranking Minority Member
Senate Appropriations Committee

Picture a United States senator in your mind and you're likely to come up with someone very much like Robert Byrd.

The 38-year veteran of the Senate has the shock of silvery hair associated with fictional legislators, coupled with a florid oratorical style that distinguishes him from most of today's paler breed.

Byrd has established his reputation as a Constitutional and historical scholar of the first order. He peppers his speeches with allusions to the classics, from ancient Rome to Shakespeare, and has himself written a history of the first 200 years of the U.S. Senate. But he blends that scholastic bent and a rather formal bearing with a ready willingness to play country tunes on his fiddle at the slightest provocation.

Byrd served as majority leader of the Senate for six years during those periods that the Democrats controlled the chamber in the late 1970s and 1980s. He left the leadership job in 1989 to take over one that he considered to have more real power — the chairmanship of Appropriations.

In that post he managed to shift many federal operations to his home state, obtaining funding for an FBI office; Treasury and Internal Revenue Service facilities; a Fish and Wildlife training center; a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms office; and a National Aeronautics and Space Administration research center in various West Virginia cities. “I want to be West Virginia's billion dollar industry,” he told his constituents.

Byrd's grasp of the issues, his unparalleled knowledge of parliamentary procedure and his continuing input in determining the location of

public works projects have allowed him to retain considerable power, even in the minority.

REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT LIVINGSTON
(Republican, Louisiana)
Chairman, House Appropriations Committee

The man who shares with his Senate counterpart the central role in deciding on the allocation of federal funds is a former Louisiana state prosecutor who has been in the House since 1977.

A staunch conservative, Livingston has consistently gotten ratings in the high 90s from the American Conservative Union, offset by just about straight zeros from the liberal Americans for Democratic Action.

No higher than the fifth-ranking Republican on the Appropriations Committee when his party took over the House of Representatives in the 1994 elections, Livingston was handpicked as chairman by the new Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich. In Livingston, Gingrich saw someone far more willing than his senior colleagues to eliminate certain federal programs by zeroing out their appropriations.

“I have become The Grinch that Stole Christmas,” the New York Times quoted Livingston as saying. “But it has its compensation; I have also gone from 18 years in the wilderness to suddenly a center of attraction, for good or bad.”

Before his sudden rise to the committee's chairmanship, Livingston had served — without attracting broad public attention — on its Foreign Operations and Defense subcommittees. He helped channel well over \$1,000 million in defense construction spending to his home area's Avondale Shipyard — the very same facility where he had worked decades earlier to pay his way through college.

Livingston was a supporter of the line-item veto proposal, approved last year, that enhances the

president's power to cut spending approved by Congress.

He ran unsuccessfully for governor of Louisiana in 1987.

REPRESENTATIVE DAVID OBEY

(Democrat, Wisconsin)

Ranking Minority Member

House Appropriations Committee

Politics has been pretty much of a lifetime career for David Obey.

He was elected to the Wisconsin Assembly at the age of 24, shortly after getting his masters degree in political science from the University of Wisconsin; six years later he won a special election for the House vacancy created by the resignation of Melvin Laird to be President Richard Nixon's secretary of defense.

There he has served for almost 28 years, compiling a record that led the authoritative "Almanac of American Politics" to describe him as "one of the ablest and most strongly motivated legislators now on the minority side of the aisle."

The publication calls Obey a true believer in traditional liberalism, in Keynesian economics and economic redistribution — one who thinks that

"government should provide economic security, create jobs, and build infrastructure through public investment, that it should control health care costs and guarantee coverage with choice of physician for everyone."

He was able to argue for many of these positions during two terms as chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, something of a think tank within the Congress that draws its membership from both the House and Senate. During his JEC service, as well, he prepared studies designed to show that economic policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations benefited the rich at the expense of the middle class.

Obey narrowly lost a race for the chairmanship of the House Budget Committee in 1980; he finally rose to a committee leadership post in 1985, when he was named to head the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. He was chosen chairman of the full committee in 1994, upon the death of Chairman William Natcher, serving briefly in that post until the Republicans swept to power in the House at year's end.

A feisty partisan over the years, Obey continues to exercise a strong, if informal, leadership role over like-minded Democrats in the Congress. ©

FACT SHEET: HEADS OF CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN POLICY COMMITTEES

*Listed below are the leaders and ranking members of the committees and subcommittees
that deal with the majority of foreign affairs issues in the 105th Congress.
Committee chairs are always from the majority party — the Republican Party in the current Congress.*

House International Relations Committee

Chair – Benjamin Gilman, New York
Ranking Minority Member – Lee Hamilton, Indiana

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Chair – Jesse Helms, North Carolina
Ranking Minority Member – Joseph Biden, Delaware

House Appropriations Committee

Chair – Robert Livingston, Louisiana
Ranking Minority Member – David Obey, Wisconsin

Senate Appropriations Committee

Chair – Ted Stevens, Alaska
Ranking Minority Member – Robert Byrd, West Virginia

House National Security Committee

Chair – Floyd Spence, South Carolina
Ranking Minority Member – Ronald Dellums, California

Senate Armed Services Committee

Chair – Strom Thurmond, South Carolina
Ranking Minority Member – Carl Levin, Michigan

House Select Committee on Intelligence

Chair – Porter Goss, Florida
Ranking Minority Member – Norm Dicks, Washington

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Chair – Richard Shelby, Alabama
Ranking Minority Member – Bob Kerrey, Nebraska

House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

Chair – Dan Burton, Indiana
Ranking Minority Member – Henry Waxman, California

Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

Chair – Fred Thompson, Tennessee
Ranking Minority Member – John Glenn, Ohio

House Judiciary Committee

Chair – Henry Hyde, Illinois
Ranking Minority Member – John Conyers, Michigan

Senate Judiciary Committee

Chair – Orrin Hatch, Utah
Ranking Minority Member – Patrick Leahy, Vermont

House Ways and Means Committee

Chair – Bill Archer, Texas
Ranking Minority Member – Charles Rangel, New York

Senate Finance Committee

Chair – William Roth, Delaware
Ranking Minority Member – Daniel Patrick Moynihan, New York

House Banking and Financial Services Committee

Chair – Jim Leach, Iowa
Ranking Minority Member – Henry Gonzalez, Texas

Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee

Chair – Alfonse D'Amato, New York
Ranking Minority Member – Paul Sarbanes, Maryland

House Commerce Committee

Chair – Thomas Bliley, Virginia
Ranking Minority Member – John Dingell, Michigan

Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee

Chair – John McCain, Arizona
Ranking Minority Member – Ernest Hollings, South Carolina

THE SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Asia and the Pacific

Chair – Doug Bereuter, Nebraska
Ranking Minority Member – Howard Berman,
California

International Operations and Human Rights

Chair – Chris Smith, New Jersey
Ranking Minority Member – Tom Lantos, California

Western Hemisphere

Chair – Elton Gallegly, California
Ranking Minority Member – Gary Ackerman, New York

International Economic Policy and Trade

Chair – Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Florida
Ranking Minority Member – Sam Gejdenson,
Connecticut

Africa

Chair – Ed Royce, California
Ranking Minority Member – Robert Menendez,
New Jersey

THE SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

African Affairs

Chair – John Ashcroft, Missouri
Ranking Minority Member – Russell Feingold, Wisconsin

East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Chair – Craig Thomas, Wyoming
Ranking Minority Member – John Kerry, Massachusetts

European Affairs

Chair – Gordon Smith, Oregon
Ranking Minority Member – Joseph Biden, Delaware

International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion

Chair – Chuck Hagel, Nebraska
Ranking Minority Member – Paul Sarbanes, Maryland

International Operations

Chair – Rod Grams, Minnesota
Ranking Minority Member – Dianne Feinstein,
California

Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Chair – Sam Brownback, Kansas
Ranking Minority Member – Charles Robb, Virginia

Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism

Chair – Paul Coverdell, Georgia
Ranking Minority Member – Christopher Dodd,
Connecticut

Clinton and Congress: The Challenges Ahead
KEY INTERNET SITES

Please note that USIS assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below which reside solely with the providers.

Almanac of American Politics
<http://politicsusa.com/PoliticsUSA/resources/almanac/>

Committee on Foreign Relations
<http://www.senate.gov/committee/foreign.html>

Committee on International Relations
http://www.house.gov/international_relations/welcome.htm

Congress.Org
<http://policy.net/>

Congressional Pictorial Directory
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/105_pictorial

DefenseLINK
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Foreign Policy Analysis Section of the ISA
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The U.S. Federal Executive Branch Foreign Affairs Community
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Clinton and Congress: The Challenges Ahead ARTICLE ALERT

Hillen, John. GENERAL CHAOS (National Review, vol. XLVIII, no. 25, December 31, 1996, pp. 21-22.)
Hillen says U.S. presidents, especially those confronted by a Congress led by an opposing political party, tend to make their boldest foreign policy initiatives in their second terms. He notes, for example, that immediately after President Clinton's re-election he made critical decisions related to the continued deployment of U.S. troops in Bosnia and signaled his willingness to commit the military in support of a humanitarian mission in Zaire. He also says Clinton has assembled a team of military advisers who will "not resist focusing on the protracted and thankless tasks of military interventions in 'complex humanitarian emergencies' on the periphery of strategic U.S. interests."

Doherty, Carroll J. CHALLENGES LOOM AHEAD FOR PRESIDENT (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 54, no. 48, December 7, 1996, pp.3344-3350)

Given the unsettled state of the world, the president's new national security team will have a lot of work to do, the author contends. "A huge pile of unfinished business remains from Clinton's first term," he says, relating to Bosnia, the Middle East peace process, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, North Korea, Russia, NATO membership for the former Warsaw Bloc nations, and the humanitarian crises in Africa. The president "will need to court" the Republican Congress "far more assiduously" than in his first-term, the author says.

Heilbrunn, Jacob. UNVISIONARY (The New Republic, vol. 215, issue 20, November 11, 1996, p. 6, 60)

"American foreign policy did not suddenly become confusing under Bill Clinton. It has always been confused. And the traits deplored by Clinton's foes — his flexibility and adaptability — are the very ones that make for an impressive foreign policy," the author contends. Heilbrunn suggests that Clinton, in his second term, may, like Reagan before him, "make his mark" in foreign policy. "Sometimes it takes a visionary to abandon visions," the author says.

Crock, Stan and Borrus, Amy (with others). FOREIGN POLICY: ONCE MORE, WITH VISION (Business Week, November 18, 1996, p. 48)
Given the range of trouble spots and crises around the world, the authors contend, President Clinton must develop a clearer vision for foreign policy decisions in his second term. Failure on the president's part to devise a strategic plan for foreign policy could produce disastrous consequences and "one long course in international crisis management" they warn. They cite troubles on the economic security front, difficulties in U.S. relations with traditional allies and, most significantly, a variety of problems with China.

Weinrod, Bruce W. THE NEED FOR WESTERN LEADERSHIP (The World & I, vol. 11, no. 12, December 1996, pp. 36-41)

As a world leader the United States "continues to be the only acceptable honest broker for European nations," the author states. Weinrod says the U.S. should lobby at the earliest opportunity for full European Union membership for central and eastern European nations. NATO expansion also should be high on the U.S. agenda. The U.S. must ensure that central and eastern Europe "become permanent parts of the sphere of world freedom," he concludes.

Nunn, Sam. SURVEYING THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE (Aviation Week and Space Technology, vol. 145, no. 22, pp. 66-70.)

Retired Senator Sam Nunn examines U.S. vital interests, weapons proliferation, the potential for terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, NATO enlargement and other issues on America's security agenda and notes that "the end of the Cold War did not render deterrence obsolete." He says that NATO enlargement raises several questions that have to be addressed as part of the U.S. strategic agenda and that "sound arms control agreements can and do enhance" security. ©

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