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TRANSFORMING THE U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP:
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The newly transformed U.S.-Russian relationship will not only allow both sides to reduce sharply the number of deployed strategic offensive nuclear weapons; it also will allow Russians "opportunities that they could not have dreamed of as citizens of the Soviet Union," says Baker Spring, the F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy at the Heritage Foundation. |
The reason for this is simple: The joint declaration serves to restore the role of power politics in U.S.-Russian relations to its proper place. During the Cold War, power politics came to dominate, if not define in its entirety, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. This relationship imposed heavy burdens on the citizens of both nations, but particularly on the citizens of the Soviet Union. The transformed relationship between the United States and Russia is allowing both sides to shed these burdens and pursue new opportunities.
Some commentators have argued that the transformed relationship is merely a reflection of the relative strength of the United States over Russia, and is something the United States dictated to the Russian government at the expense of the Russian people. 2 While the United States is clearly the stronger of the two nations at this time, and power politics will always play a significant role in their relationship, this analysis fails to account for the fact that power politics is no longer dominant. In short, the critics are mistaken because they are judging the new relationship by an outdated, Cold War measure.
Where these critics have been most led astray by their analysis is in the implication that the transformed U.S.-Russian relationship will prove harmful to the Russian citizenry. Nothing could be further from the truth. Having shed the burdens imposed on them by a Soviet government that focused single-mindedly on enhancing the power of the state, the Russian people now have opportunities that they could not have dreamed of as citizens of the Soviet Union. As a result, it is appropriate to take stock of where the Soviet Union was during the Cold War and reflect on both U.S. and Russian contributions to a transformed relationship, and how this relationship will benefit the Russian people in particular.
The Soviet Union and the Dominance of Power Politics
The Soviet Union was founded as a nation that glorified the accumulation of power, particularly state power. The Communist ideology that legitimized the regime as a result drove the state to view power not as a means for achieving higher values such as liberty and prosperity, but as an end in itself. It also drove the state to ask for ever-higher sacrifices from the Soviet people in service to the goal of expanding its own power and prestige.
At the international level, the same purpose drove the Soviet regime to gauge its prestige by its ability to intimidate and coerce other states. The Soviet people paid a horrific price for the ambitions of the Soviet state. Individual liberty was denied. The economy became overly militarized, and the standard of living fell. Spiritual outlets were closed off.
As the Soviet Union eventually discovered, the pursuit of power at the expense of other values is unsustainable and doomed to failure. Its superpower capability ultimately proved hollow. The reason for this is that the regime's demands on its population ultimately led to societal exhaustion. The state took from the people and offered little in return, other than the proclamation of its superpower status.
The United States, by contrast, sought power and asked for sacrifices from its people, but usually in the defense of individual liberty, while also offering the prospect of greater prosperity. Government and power served the people, as opposed to the practice in the Soviet Union, where people served the government in order to feed the state's insatiable appetite for greater power.
The difference between the two countries, as superpower rivals, was telling. The accumulation of power by the United States, where power served to improve the lot of the American people, proved more sustainable.
The Soviet Union's confrontation with the United States during the Cold War only increased the pressure on Soviet society and accelerated the rate of exhaustion. Ultimately, the question facing the Soviet people was whether the competition with the United States for power was worth the sacrifice. By the end of 1991, the people of the Soviet Union answered the question in the negative, and the Cold War was over. Since 1991, the people of Russia have been faced with the question of whether to embark on an attempt to achieve power equal to that of the Soviet Union against the United States -- yet again at their own expense.
On May 24, 2002, Presidents Bush and Putin signed the declaration for a new strategic framework, in part to answer this question. Implied in that declaration is that the governments of Russia and the United States are putting their people first, and the accumulation of power for its own sake last.
Russian and U.S. Contributions to the New Strategic Framework
There are a number of specific ways Russia and the United States, both separately and together, have contributed to the creation of the new strategic framework. At the outset, however, it is critical to recognize the two overarching contributions of these two governments.
The Russian government's general contribution to the strategic framework is its recognition that it need not calculate its self-worth on the basis of whether it has more power than the United States. Rather, it now appears willing to judge its success primarily by its ability to improve the quality of the lives of its people. As the joint declaration states, "We [the United States and Russia] recognize that the security, prosperity, and future hopes of our peoples rest on a benign security environment, the advancement of political and economic freedoms, and international cooperation." Unlike the Soviet Union, the Russian government seems to have its priorities right. Perhaps paradoxically, the new priorities actually improve the likelihood that Russia will be able to renew and strengthen itself over time.
The overarching U.S. contribution to the strategic framework is similar to those that it has made in other contexts: an attitude of magnanimity toward previous adversaries. The United States demonstrated that it could resist the temptation to use its position of strength to subjugate or exploit other people when it sought the reconstitution of Germany and Japan as independent states after World War II. Its behavior contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union's treatment of Eastern Europeans during the same era. The United States, contrary to what some critics think, is not using the new strategic framework to exploit the Russian people. The United States is not fearful of a powerful Russia; rather, it seeks to avoid a threatening Russia.
The New Strategic Framework and Improving the Prospects for the Russian People
It is appropriate to spend time reviewing the details of how the new strategic framework will improve the prospects for the Russian people. The positive elements of the new strategic framework for the Russian people include:
Conclusion
The Russian people should not be, to quote Masha Lipman, "passive and reluctant" supporters of a cooperative policy toward the United States. 3 They should be rejoicing. They will be the recipients of the tangible benefits of a relationship between the United States and Russia that is no longer guided by desperate attempts to achieve a position of dominance. With it, the Russian people will no longer be asked by their government to make sacrifices in the name of a political contest with the United States. They should therefore recognize the opportunity that is being presented to them by the new U.S.-Russian relationship.
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(1) The White House, "Text of Joint Declaration," May 24, 2002, as made available at http://www.whitehouse.gov./news/releases/2002/05/print/20020524-2.html. (Return to text) (2) Masha Lipman, "In Russia, A Grudging Consensus," The Washington Post, May 27, 2002, p. A23. (Return to text) (3) Ibid. (Return to text)
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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.
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