
Partnership between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and governments "enables both groups to be more powerful and effective in achieving their missions," say the authors. When these two actors work together in harmony, respecting and capitalizing on their differences in structure, resources, and abilities, "the system of building peace and regional stability around the world will work more productively." Ambassador McDonald is chairman and co-founder of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy in Washington, D.C. Notter is a program associate at the institute.
In dealing with issues of global security and regional stability, the U.S. government has a major, but often unrecognized, ally in the community of nongovernmental organizations. In fact, over the past several decades, there has been growing evidence that unofficial actors, including NGOs, are playing an increasingly important role in the development and implementation of government policies. There is a specific part of the NGO community that focuses on issues of "conflict resolution" or "track two diplomacy," where NGOs work unofficially -- often in cooperation with governments -- to help resolve ethnic conflicts around the world that constitute a major threat to regional stability and peace.
The notion that governments can and should work in concert with unofficial actors in developing and implementing foreign policy is, of course, not new. The term "track two diplomacy" was coined in 1981 by former U.S. diplomat Joseph Montville to describe the efforts of ordinary citizens and unofficial organizations to resolve conflict. The basic notion behind track two diplomacy is that peace and conflict resolution cannot be achieved by governments alone. Unofficial, informal, behind-the-scenes contact plays a vital role in conflict resolution and in promoting regional security.
The real challenge of track two diplomacy lies in the interrelationship between the official and unofficial spheres, which can be a sensitive one. Those working unofficially do not want to feel pressured or unduly constrained when they explore a policy or process that government officials oppose. Official rejection of a multi-track plan can preclude project implementation.
Government officials, on the other hand, should be kept informed. Track two practitioners must recognize that if their initiative is to succeed, they will probably have to coordinate their activities with officials at the government level. It is governments, after all, that are responsible for negotiating, signing, and ratifying treaties and other formal documents that may be needed to seal the unofficial, successful initiatives.
These two important parts of the peacemaking system become more effective when they work in cooperation with each other, instead of on parallel tracks. When there is mutual acceptance and support, both elements can benefit. This is especially true in the area of security and regional stability, where both NGOs and governments are simultaneously working to resolve ethnic conflicts but are using different means and different points of entry.
During the Cold War, even before the term was coined, many NGOs and individuals were involved in track two diplomacy, attempting to build bridges between the two superpowers and working to de-escalate conflicts and crises, which, given the nuclear capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union, represented very serious threats. The American Friends Service Committee and Moral Re-Armament worked unofficially on relations between East and West Germany, and between France and Germany, in the 1950s and 1960s. Several prominent individuals and journalists have been involved in unofficial dialogues in crisis situations, including the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The Dartmouth Conference, a nongovernmental dialogue group that focused on Cold War issues, started in 1959 and continued through the late 1980s. The group met many times during those decades, discussing informally the important differences of the day in U.S.-Soviet relations. Even at times when government officials of the two nations refused to meet, the officials actually requested that Dartmouth Conference groups continue to meet, to keep the door open and information flowing between the two adversaries.
As we enter the next millennium, it appears that unofficial actors, in particular NGOs, will continue to play an important role in foreign policy development and implementation. This can occur in a variety of ways, including very specific links between two or more NGOs working directly in a specific conflict situation (as in Cyprus), indigenous NGOs working in a region plagued by ethnic conflict and instability (the Horn of Africa), and links between intergovernmental organizations and NGOs (Bosnia).
Cyprus
The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) in Washington, D.C., and the Conflict Management Group (CMG) in Cambridge, Massachusetts, have joined together under the name of the "Cyprus Consortium" in order to implement a training program in Cyprus focusing on conflict resolution. The U.S. government has put an emphasis on resolving this conflict, as evidenced most recently by the appointment of Bosnia peace broker Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as Special Presidential Emissary for Cyprus. Holbrooke and the other U.S. government staff who are working to help resolve the Cyprus conflict are focusing on the political dimensions of the conflict and on the official, UN-sponsored negotiations. The work of the Cyprus Consortium, however, focuses on the social level, providing opportunities for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to work together, build trust relationships, and demonstrate to their communities the potential for cooperation between the two sides in this conflict. The Consortium has trained several hundred Greek and Turkish Cypriots in conflict resolution skills, project development and management, and training design and delivery. This group of grass-roots peacebuilders has organized dozens of bicommunal projects including musical concerts and youth programs, and has facilitated dialogue sessions on the Cyprus conflict.
From the beginning, the relationship between the Consortium and U.S. government personnel has been one of cooperation and mutual support. The Consortium continuously keeps the U.S. government staff well informed of its activities, and the U.S. Embassy and officials in Washington have often called upon Consortium staff to consult on issues they are working on. Similarly, the Consortium has often enlisted the support of embassy staff in developing and implementing its training programs. Once the grass-roots work in Cyprus reached a certain level, the embassy even appointed a special coordinator for bicommunal affairs to serve as a liaison between the embassy and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots doing bicommunal conflict resolution work.
When bicommunal contact was cut off by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities in December 1997, the U.S. Embassy issued a statement urging that the bicommunal activities be allowed to resume. An embassy spokesperson stated that while bicommunal activities "will not solve the Cyprus problem," the "free association" that they permit "is what civil society is all about." Such a statement demonstrates that the work of governments and of NGOs in resolving conflicts and enhancing regional stability are not so separate and distinct. Official U.S. foreign policy efforts and the grass-roots work of NGOs can work together to support the unique goals of each party to the partnership.
Horn of Africa
Another example of government-NGO cooperation related to the issue of regional stability and conflict resolution comes from the Horn of Africa. In 1994, President Clinton launched a Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In an initial concept paper entitled "Building a Foundation for Food Security and Crisis Prevention in the Greater Horn of Africa," GHAI representatives laid out the concept for their program to address the issue of regional stability and food security in the Horn. They recognized the link between development and emergency aid on one hand, and conflict prevention, crisis management, and conflict resolution on the other.
More importantly, they also explicitly recognized, from the very beginning, the link between governments, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs. In the report, GHAI describes itself as a "collaborative effort among African states, nongovernmental organizations, concerned citizens, Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development, and the international donor community to address the root causes of food insecurity in the Horn." The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy was one of several NGOs that were consulted in the development of the report and the set of activities that followed from the report. IMTD also cooperated during a training program organized by the United States Institute of Peace (an independent, non-partisan organization funded by the U.S. Congress) and GHAI staff.
Finally, GHAI recently requested proposals looking for a team of NGOs to manage a grant-making program for NGOs in the Horn of Africa that would implement activities in support of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. The program includes direct grants to local NGOs as well as an institutional strengthening program that will support the development of the NGO sector in the Horn. In this example, NGOs assisted USAID in the development of the $10 million program, NGOs are primarily responsible for the implementation of the program, and the target recipients of aid are NGOs in the region.
OSCE
A final example highlights the link between NGOs and an intergovernmental organization. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is working closely with many NGOs, both from the United States and locally, in organizing and implementing programs to support the civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia. IMTD was approached in December 1996 by the OSCE to see if the two groups could work together on the matter of social peacebuilding. With funding from the U.S. Information Agency, IMTD trained 70 Bosnians from the Bosnian-Serb, Bosnian-Muslim, and Bosnian-Croat communities. The OSCE played a vital role as the convener, in the five cities in which the training took place, because it provided a "safe haven" for all participants.
As all of these examples indicate, government/NGO cooperation in the area of security policy and regional stability is increasing. NGOs, both domestically and, in particular, in the regions where conflict and instability exist, are not merely valuable resources to government policy makers, but they also represent important partners. Partnership between NGOs and governments enables both groups to be more powerful and effective in achieving their missions. Both NGOs and governments retain their particular characteristics; the goal is not to merge the work of these two actors in the system. Rather, as in any system, when component parts work together in harmony, respecting and capitalizing on their differences in structure, resources, and abilities, the system of building peace and regional stability around the world will work more productively.
U.S. Foreign
Policy Agenda
USIA Electronic Journal, Vol. 3, No. 3, July
1998