The NATO enlargement debate, which entails both "solemn security guarantees and a significant amount of money," is helping "to set our course on European security policy for the coming years," Rosner notes. He is confident that when the debate is over, the U.S. Senate will vote to ratify the admission to NATO of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Rosner was interviewed by Managing Editor Dian McDonald.

Question: Is NATO enlargement the most important foreign policy issue the Clinton administration must deal with in the next few months?

Rosner: It's certainly one of our highest priorities and certainly will be a major issue for Congress, given that unlike some foreign policy initiatives, it centers very distinctly around a specific vote, and one that requires a two-thirds margin.

Because of the stakes involved and the consequences involved, it will be both for the country and the U.S. Senate a very major debate and decision. In some ways, it's the first major debate over European security policy that the country will have since the end of the Cold War. It entails both solemn security guarantees and a significant amount of money. And it really helps to set our course on European security policy for the coming years. For all those reasons, it will be quite a major decision, and I am sure will be treated that way on Capitol Hill.

Q: To what extent is the administration lobbying Congress on NATO enlargement, and what strategy is it using in that effort?

Rosner: I don't know if I would call it lobbying, but we certainly are using all of the resources available to make the case -- both to the Congress and to the public -- for why we think NATO enlargement is good for American national security. The president and Secretary Albright and all of us who are working for them have spent a substantial amount of time and effort talking to members of Congress, engaging in hearings, preparing materials for them, including the report on this issue that the president sent to Congress in February and the letter that he sent September 11 to 20 senators, answering a wide range of core questions about NATO enlargement. We are also talking with the public, going all over the country to forums on these kinds of issues, talking with groups who are interested in NATO enlargement -- ranging from the veterans' community to the religious community to the business community to ethnic communities. Because of the level of consequence, it clearly requires a great deal of discussion, both on Capitol Hill and outside of Washington.

And we've done everything possible to stimulate that debate as early as possible. And I think the fact that the president and the secretary established this office (NATO Enlargement Ratification Office, U.S. Department of State) -- and it's dedicated to just those functions -- is a sign that they wanted more debate on this and not less -- and an earlier debate, rather than simply attention at the last minute.

Q: What do you think will be the effect of the September 17 letter to Secretary Albright from Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in which he discussed NATO enlargement and outlined plans for committee hearings on the issue?

Rosner: We certainly welcome the letter and the statement by the chairman that he wants to help ratification succeed. We understand that he still has some concerns about this, and we hope that the congressional hearings can help address his concerns and those of his colleagues. We have encouraged and welcomed hearings on NATO enlargement from very early on. Both Secretary Albright and Defense Secretary Cohen testified last April before the Senate Armed Services Committee. We have engaged quite energetically with other congressional forums on this, including hearings and meetings in the House, and with the Senate NATO Observer Group that the two leaders in the Senate established. We have met with that group on a regular basis, everyone from the president, the vice president, and the secretary on down. Our view is that the more this issue is aired, the more support there will be and the more comfortable Congress will feel about it. And we certainly hope to have the chairman's support on NATO enlargement. We would welcome his support and are encouraged by the statement he made in his letter.

Q: In the foreign affairs arena, is your office engaged in any specific multilateral or bilateral activities right now related to NATO enlargement?

Rosner: We certainly do take close note of the ratification efforts abroad and of the way this is being debated abroad, in part because to a very noticeable degree the reaction to this issue overseas is having a major impact on the debate here in the United States, and especially in the Congress. So we stay very closely abreast of the political debates and the press debates overseas on this. We meet with many foreign officials who are interested in our ratification effort so that we can get better insights into their ratification effort. And I, along with other people in my office, have spoken overseas about what we are doing to try to make sure there is a good understanding abroad of our ratification effort and the concerns that the American public and the American Congress have about this issue.

Q: What risks are inherent in the alternative to enlarging NATO -- that is, maintaining NATO at its Cold War membership?

Rosner: I think there are a number of risks. And as people -- both in Congress and outside Congress -- focus on the question of the costs of this initiative, which they should, they also should focus on the costs of not moving ahead. As the president suggested on that very question in his report to Congress in February, there are many costs connected with that. First, it would risk leaving the security status of Central Europe undefined and risk making that region less secure. And we should recall that in this century two world wars and a cold war have had their roots, in part, in that region and its insecurity and instability at various points. And so it would be a historic mistake to miss the opportunity to enhance the security and stability and definition of that region because that is probably the best thing we can do to avoid being drawn back into war in Europe, as we have been in this century.

Second, if we fail to enlarge NATO, we would fail to strengthen the alliance. The three countries that will come in will bring some 300,000 troops and other security resources. They have already demonstrated their determination to contribute to security beyond their borders by their efforts in the Gulf War and in Bosnia. And we would lose the opportunity to have three states that are willing, able, and really eager to help us address Europe's new security challenges.

And, third, I think if NATO were not enlarging, we would not be seeing some of the very positive trends in that region. We have seen nearly a dozen agreements reached among the states in the region to settle their border and ethnic disputes; partly that is because states in the region know that to be credible applicants for NATO membership they must take such steps. And it's doubtful whether these trends toward stability and a deepening of democracy would be taking place to the extent they are in the region if this were not going forward.

And finally, I think there is a cost in terms of what it would imply about our view of Europe and its divisions. If we failed to enlarge NATO, we would in effect be making permanent the dividing line in Europe that Stalin imposed and maintained by force through the Cold War. And that dividing line is certainly outdated at this point and illegitimate. And so if we seek to erase the dividing line in Europe and help build a Europe that is undivided and democratic and at peace, then we certainly must start by taking in qualified members in Central Europe and embracing a process that will take in more in the future.

Q: Do you believe that the widely varying cost estimates for NATO enlargement reported by the media could be a deciding factor in the outcome of the debate over the issue?

Rosner: Congress certainly will look very closely at the costs of NATO enlargement. They have already indicated that they are very concerned about this. And they should pay a great deal of attention to it at a time when we are working to balance the budget. But I think now that we know which countries are coming into NATO, and now that NATO is formulating its own estimates of the resource implications, members of Congress over the coming months will be able to gain more certainty about the policy and understand what the resource implications are. And I expect that as all that becomes clear, they will have a firmer basis for making the core decision about whether the benefits do justify the costs. We view this as a relatively modest investment with an extremely high payoff. We have estimated the U.S. share of the cost to be between $150 million to $200 million a year over the next decade. And compared to the billions we spent on World War Two, and the trillions we spent on the Cold War, it seems that if this can buy us future decades of security and stability in Central Europe and the rest of Europe, then it is an excellent investment.

Q: How would you characterize the significance of the Madrid Summit actions for European security and also in terms of the restructuring and future of NATO as an organization?

Rosner: The Madrid Summit was quite historic. The alliance made the decision to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin the process of entering the alliance. Certainly that was the most significant decision since the end of the Cold War in many ways. And, further, it declared that the door would remain open to the addition of other members in the future. And it noted in particular the progress of Romania and Slovenia and noted the aspirations of the Baltics to join as well.

In addition, the Madrid Summit continued to move ahead with the process of NATO's adaptation, its improvements, the streamlining of its command structures, its efforts to increase its abilities in many ways through, for example, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the enhancements in Partnership for Peace, the charter with Ukraine, and the Founding Act with Russia. Taken together, this is a dramatic set of initiatives that firmly orient NATO toward Europe's new security challenges and toward the goal that we have spoken of -- a Europe that really is undivided, democratic, and at peace for perhaps the first time in its history.

Q: How does NATO enlargement affect U.S. relations with non-NATO countries other than those that are being considered for future membership?

Rosner: When you look at the full range of initiatives that are being launched during this period -- not just the addition of the three countries, but also the open door policy, the new accords with Russia and Ukraine, the enhancements of Partnership for Peace, as well as our own bilateral efforts with the states in the region -- I think it's clear why so many of the states in the region that were not invited to begin the process of joining at Madrid nonetheless have expressed their strong support for the decisions at Madrid and have said that even though they have not now been invited to join, they view the decisions made at Madrid as something that will improve their security as well.

One example that underscored this was the tremendous reception that the president and secretary received in Bucharest, Romania, a couple of days after the Madrid Summit. There were over 100,000 people filling the streets to applaud the president and the decisions of Madrid, even though Romania had expressed a keen interest in being invited into NATO but was not. And there were strong statements by President Constantinescu of appreciation for the process that NATO had begun. So, I think we have a good deal of evidence that this overall set of initiatives is something that the region as a whole has welcomed, and that is helping to improve security and stability in the region.

Q: How do you foresee the next steps for NATO enlargement if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are granted membership?

Rosner: NATO has declared that it will review the open door process in 1999, that it will keep an open door for considering the membership aspirations of other applicant states, and will continue to work with them through the Partnership for Peace program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. I think after the first states are ratified -- which I am confident will happen by 1999 -- people will want to see how that process went. But I think they will turn their attention both to the integration of those three states in an orderly way and to considerations about the next states that continue to have aspirations for membership.

Q: What is the key challenge for the administration now in terms of NATO enlargement?

Rosner: Right now we're in the middle of accession talks with the three states. We need to complete those. We need to complete the study with our NATO allies of the resource implications of this, and then move to lay this before the Senate for its ratification. I expect the Senate will look very hard at what this means for American taxpayers, for our relations with Russia, for the states not initially invited in, for NATO's effectiveness; the Senate as well will consider its relationship to decisions and operations in Bosnia. But after the Congress looks at those issues, I am confident that after a rigorous debate it will vote to ratify the admission of these three states. We will then have to move to ratification by all of the other allied states. It must be done unanimously.

And then I think the challenge will be to show that this is a plus for the alliance and a plus for Europe and a plus for America's own security. And the process of bringing the states into the alliance is the best way to prove that. Although that process will take some years, I think ultimately it is their entrance into the alliance itself that will give people confidence that this has been good for us, good for our allies, and good for the alliance.