Preventive diplomacy and the reduction of conflict at any stage of its evolution should be an integral part of the foreign policies of all nations," says Zartman. There may be disagreement among nations on the reasons behind a conflict, he notes, but the conclusion of that conflict, "and its pursuit without violence, are goals that all states can share." Zartman is professor of international organization and conflict resolution and director of African studies at The Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. He was professor of politics at New York University and has lectured at universities in Africa, the Middle East and Europe. A specialist in North Africa, he was elected president of the newly-organized American Institute for Maghribi Studies. He is the author of numerous articles and books, including "Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa," and "Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars.

Like Moliere's M. Jourdain, who spoke prose all his life without knowing it, diplomats have long been practicing preventive diplomacy without being particularly aware of it. But since naming is the beginning of knowledge, the identification of the practice permits specific focus on its meaning and components. Preventive diplomacy refers to diplomatic measures taken to prevent political conflicts from turning violent, or more comprehensively, in the words of U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "action to prevent disputes from arising among parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."

The concept and practice of preventive diplomacy were first identified in the United Nations Charter, which states that the purpose of the world organization is to use "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace...(to) save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." U.N. secretaries-general have spoken of its importance for the U.N. and its member states, and the latter in turn have adopted the concept as their own.

The Family of Strategies

The family of conflict reduction strategies to achieve this purpose -- prevention, management, resolution, transformation -- relate to different moments in the life of a conflict when preventive diplomacy measures can be effective. Conflict, it should be remembered, is a necessary, inevitable, and often useful part of human relations. Whenever two parties cannot accomplish related goals at the same time, there is conflict, and whenever there is change, conflict is likely to be involved. Conflict should be able to be dealt with on the political level, but when pressure and resistance are too strong, it escalates to violence.

Conflict prevention focuses on efforts to keep conflict on the political level and to deal with the causes that might press it on to violence. One of the most striking American-led efforts at conflict prevention was the Namibian initiative, which began under President Carter and continued to a successful conclusion by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker under President Reagan; although some violence was present in the Namibian efforts to attain independence (and increased during the course of the decade of negotiations), it was much lower than the level of conflict in neighboring Angola or Zimbabwe -- thanks to early efforts to resolve the issue diplomatically.

Conflict management deals with violent conflict which diplomatic efforts seek to reduce to the political level. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke managed the conflict in Bosnia in 1995 by mediating the Dayton agreement that ended the war and left the conflict to be worked out at the political level. However, conflict management does not remove the conflict.

Conflict resolution brings the political issues to a conclusion, although this might often be clearer conceptually than in reality. The new constitution in South Africa finalized a resolution of the conflict over apartheid, opening up the new political system to handle remaining and consequent problems as part of a next chapter in South African history. Conflict resolution is usually left to time and the parties themselves, with little room for a direct diplomatic role for outsiders. The United States played a positive role in helping South Africa along, particularly with its sanctions and its aid programs to anti-apartheid civil society, but resolution was in local hands.

Conflict transformation is a more recent term used to indicate the establishment of new, positive relationships among the formerly conflicting parties. It is a long process, the kind of evolution that characterized Franco-German reconciliation within the successive institutions that grew to be the European Union, or the reversal of hostile relations with the Axis powers after World War II, or the change in Russo-American relations after the Cold War, or the tentatively begun and frequently rejected advancement in Arab-Israeli relations since the peace process first began with U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 after the 1967 war. The United States has had a role in these gradual changes, and the latter three have been important parts of American foreign policy.

The U.N. classification of strategies to promote peace shows a slightly different focus that is directly related to the provisions in the U.N. Charter. Preventive diplomacy in U.N. parlance refers more generally to conflict prevention, and Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's new focus on peacebuilding refers to measures that can induce conflict transformation. In between is the classic U.N. distinction between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Peacemaking relates to Chapter VI activities where the consent of the conflicting states and the use of peaceful means are involved. For example, the special representative of the secretary general in Angola, Alioune Blondin Beye -- supported by the U.S. special representative to Angola, Paul Hare -- produced the Lusaka agreement ending the Angolan civil war in 1994. Peace enforcement refers to Chapter VII activities; they are carried out without the consent of the states and with the use of coercive measures. The U.S.-led coalition that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation during the 1991 Gulf War is such a case. Peacekeeping, often called "Chapter VI 1/2" because it is not explicitly provided for in the charter, refers to military deployment that is intended to facilitate an agreed settlement but that may involve danger from non-consenting forces. There are currently 16 of these U.N. operations -- called "Blue Helmet" missions -- deployed in the world.

This complex of activities involves multiple tactical means, ranging from the use of military forces to diplomatic measures, from economic pressure to even social and cultural programs. Indeed, the general goal would be not to exorcise conflict from the world but to infuse interstate relations with a "Culture of Conciliation," whereby conflict can be managed, resolved, and transformed without violence.

Agents and Their Interests

Preventive diplomacy can be accomplished by many agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental, from the United Nations through regional organizations to member states, and from global NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) to private institutions. Since preventive diplomacy deals primarily with state action, its primary agents are states and interstate organizations. In addition to the U.N., regional organizations are active in dealing with conflicts among members by diplomatic means; the Organization of African Unity, for example, incorporated a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution into its structure in 1993. An unusual peace enforcement activity of a sub-regional organization has been the Economic Community of West African States' Military Observer Group (ECOMOG); it has far exceeded the limitations of its name in its attempt, since 1990, to bring peace to Liberia.

It should be remembered that such international organizations are rarely independent agents; their actions are authorized and often performed by member states. States benefit from their use of global and regional organizations because such cooperative efforts diffuse responsibility, rather than leaving even positive intervention in the hands of one state. The world community can act with its moral authority and the material resources provided by its members rather than taxing the authority and resources of a single state.

State coalitions, broadening the notion of collective defense, can perform preventive diplomacy where there is no regional organization and where global interests are not involved. Thus, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), first in a military role and then as the coordinator of and a major contributor to the international peacekeeping force (IFOR), provided support for U.S. mediation in the Bosnian crisis. This collective effort replaced earlier peacekeeping attempts by other international bodies, including the U.N. and its peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) and the Western European Union (WEU).

Individual states acting alone (although often with a legitimizing collective cover) are the most frequent agents of preventive diplomacy, and as the remaining superpower, the United States is called on to perform this function more often than most. A particularly successful action has been the U.S. role -- in conjunction with resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS) -- in restoring Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to his elected position in 1994, after his removal by a coup in 1991.

Although diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts are conducted at the state level, states can often benefit from assistance provided by private organizations and individuals. U.S.-based organizations such as Refugees International, World Vision, Search for Common Ground, the Kettering Foundation, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, among others, train, connect, prepare, convene, analyze, and organize individuals and groups in areas of conflict to help them better handle their conflicts and avoid violence in the pursuit of their goals. The public and private sectors are gradually learning that unofficial diplomacy has a role to play and official diplomacy can benefit from such assistance. In the end, official agreements are concluded among state representatives, but, particularly in internal conflicts where other states are less legitimate interveners, private efforts in preparation and implementation complement state efforts. It is notable that the United States -- with its participatory, associational culture noted by Alexis de Tocqueville -- has been a pioneer in developing such methods and activities.

Conflicts have a cause and a reason, even if they are not universally understood. Some conflicts, such as anti-colonial struggles for independence, need to be carried to their conclusion; the rationale for other conflicts may seem less justifiable. But the conclusion of conflict and its pursuit without violence are goals that all states can share. With few exceptions, violence -- even in the achievement of laudable or shared goals -- is in no one's interest. Preventive diplomacy and the reduction of conflict at any stage of its evolution should be an integral part of the foreign policies of all nations. Even when geopolitical and material calculations of national interest are not evident, the saving of human life and dignity and the preservation of resources that can be used to improve the human condition are overarching justifications for preventive diplomacy.